Dependence or Independence:
New Zealand's External Relations 1942-1952

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Abstract

This thesis looks at the New Zealand's external relations in the period 1942-1952 and in particular the degree of independence, from other countries, exercised by the Government in Wellington when deciding external affairs policies. This is done by looking at two case studies, firstly New Zealand's participation in the Pacific War and the subsequent national involvement in the surrender and occupation of Japan. The second case study is the decision to seek a post-war security arrangement with the United States of America.

It will be shown that New Zealand did act independent of any other nation when formulating policy and did not simply 'do what it was told' by the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia or any other state.

Chapter One:

Introduction

The period 1942-1952 witnessed great change in New Zealand's external affairs. There was much to necessitate this change, not the least being the prosecution of the Pacific war to its successful conclusion, the emergence of the United States as the world's premier power concurrently with the decline in influence of the United Kingdom. The United Nations was formed at San Francisco in the hope of preventing further wars while at the same time communism, much to the worry of western nations, spread from the confines of the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe and China.

This period could be loosely described as the "adolescent"" period of New Zealand's post war external affairs policy. This is because it was a time when New Zealand moved away from 'the Mother Country.' (i.e. the United Kingdom) to make its own way in the field of external relations. The term 'loosely' is used as it was a period of transition for New Zealand as influences other than those of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth emerged to conclude with the signing of the ANZUS Pact in 1952.

During this period, New Zealand still showed a willingness to align itself along side much larger states, firstly with its traditional partner the United Kingdom, but as circumstances changed the United States became more important. In both

instances there has been criticism that New Zealand was simply 'following the leader,' pursuing polices that served other nations first and itself later.

It is axiomatic that national security is a prime responsibility of any government. It is equally so, therefore, that decisions taken by any government with respect to national security should provide an indication of dependence or independence in the field of external relations.

This thesis will study two major security issues of this period to ascertain whether there was independent decision making by the government in Wellington. The first will review New Zealand's involvement in the Pacific War, the assignment or otherwise of critical land forces, and the subsequent national involvement in the surrender and occupation of Japan. The second will study New Zealand's decision to seek a security guarantee from the United States of America which led to the ANZUS Pact. Both case studies are linked by the perception at the time of the serious threat to national security posed by Japan.

The following questions will be asked when looking at the two case studies:

- Was New Zealand acting independently when it decided upon its course of action?

- Was New Zealand making its decision for New Zealand's interests first or for other nations?

- What was New Zealand hoping to achieve with its policy?

- Did New Zealand achieve its goals?

During this period New Zealand was dealing with nations far larger than itself: a situation New Zealand finds at the present time (and no doubt will always be). Accordingly the findings remain relevant today.

However, before it is possible to analyse the 1942-52 period, it is necessary to look at New Zealand's external relations prior to Japan's entry into the Second World War.

In terms of external affairs, the years before 1942 can be divided into two parts. The first precedes the 1935 election of the first Labour Government, the second the years that followed.

New Zealand External Relations Prior to 1935

In actuality, the scope of New Zealand's external affairs up until the 1935 election was very limited. In 1924 New Zealand had only one High Commissioner abroad, that being in London.[1] New Zealand's external relations consisted of supporting British policies, control over the Pacific Islands of Niue, Tokelau, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands and trade with 'British' and minimally 'foreign' countries.

The first period is characterised by distinct lack of independence in the external affairs if New Zealand. The Massey Government (1912-25) in Wellington took the line that:

> ...New Zealand was not competent to advise Britain on foreign affairs, and when consulted used in reply the predetermined form "New Zealand is content to be bound by the determination of His Majesty's Government in London."[2]

New Zealand's trade relations with others were similarly very limited, although this would remain true throughout the period covered in this thesis. The vast majority of exports were to Great Britain and the Empire. These were also the major source of New Zealand's imported goods.

[1] According to the 1924 New Zealand Year Book, there were eight other Official New Zealand representatives abroad. Government Agents in Sydney, San Francisco and Vancouver, a customs representative in London and New York, a Trade Commissioner in Melbourne, an Honorary Tourist agent in Adelaide and a honorary New Zealand Representative in Calcutta.

Destination of New Zealand Exports 1924-1952

Country	1924	1930	1936	1942	1947	1952
UK	79.93%	80.14%	80.16%	74.97%	76.66%	65.33%
Australia	4.72	3.48	3.25	3.37	3.18	1.64
Canada	1.37	5.56	1.95	4.48	2.38	2.18
Other British	1.67	1.78	.92	2.26	1.94	2.90
Total British	87.69	90.96	86.28	85.08	84.16	72.05
USA	6.24	4.71	5.07	7.43	6.35	11.38
Other Foreign	6.07	4.33	8.65	7.49	9.49	16.57
Total Foreign	12.31	9.04	13.72	14.92	15.84	27.95

Origin of New Zealand's Imports 1924-1952

Country	1924	1930	1936	1942	1947	1952
UK	47.82%	47.58	49.37%	37.43	42.76%	54.91%
Australia	11.64	6.81	11.16	15.12	11.61	10.62
Canada	8.07	8.95	7.52	4.36	9.03	3.52
Other British	6.30	5.05	4.69	11.16	9.89	7.10
Total British	73.83	68.39	72.74	68.07	73.29	76.15
USA	16.05	17.82	12.66	27.80	18.13	9.26
Other Foreign	10.12	13.79	14.60	14.13	8.58	14.59
Total Foreign	26.17	31.61	27.26	31.93	26.71	23.85

The above export/import figures show the trade aspect of New Zealand's external affairs was clearly focused on the United Kingdom and other 'British" countries. New Zealand's trade with 'non-British' countries can best be described as marginal.

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[2] BENNETT, B. New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy 1935-1939: The Promotion of Collective Security Through the League of Nations, New Zealand Institute of International affairs,

They also show the degree of dependence that New Zealand had on the strength of the British economy. New Zealand's prosperity was tied inextricably with that of the United Kingdom. It was therefore in New Zealand's interest to support Britain as any deterioration in the relationship could have harmed the trade situation and in turn placed New Zealand's economic health in jeopardy.

The status of New Zealand in the international arena during this period (i.e. prior to 1935 General election) is well illustrated by New Zealand's involvement at a conference held in Washington DC between 12 November 1921 and 6 February 1922.

The 1924 Official New Zealand Year-book contains a report by the Hon. Sir John Salmond[3] describing this conference . It clearly shows the relationship between the Dominions (including New Zealand) and Great Britain at this time.

> It is to be noticed that the invitation of the American Government to attend a Conference in Washington on the limitation of armaments and on Pacific questions was an invitation to the Government of Great Britain and to the other seven Powers – namely, France, Italy, Japan, China, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal. There was no invitation to Canada, Australia, New Zealand or any other Dominion of the Crown.[4]

Had New Zealand had an independent external relations policy, this would, or should, have been recognised by other nations. At the Washington conference

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Wellington. 1988. p.1

[3] Delegate for the Dominion of New Zealand at the conference.

Great Britain did invite a representative each from New Zealand, Australia, India and Canada; (it provided a delegate for South Africa) to be part of its delegation, however:

> The procedure of the Washington Conference was in itself a clear indication that the Dominions were not in their own right as quasi-independent States, but merely as constituent portions of an undivided Empire. When any question came to be voted on...the question was put to the British Delegation as a whole, and was answered "Yes" or "No" by Mr. Balfour as head and spokesman of that Delegation, and on behalf of the British Empire as a whole...The final decision in every case was that the of the British Empire as an indivisible unity.[5]

The view that New Zealand was 'British" rather than an independent nation continued with New Zealand's next Prime Minister, George Forbes. On February 19 1935 he delivered a speech on the international situation to the House of Representatives which shows the Government still clearly identified with British policies. It also explains the rationale for such a close association:

> My final comment is addressed directly to the people of this country. The British Dominions are not parties to this proposed [Kellog] pact just as they were not parties to the Treaty of Locarno, but if arrangement comes into force, and if ever the nations that are parties to the arrangement are required to apply the proposed guarantees, then there must be no blinking the fact that if Britain become involved in a war New Zealand would be involved. This is so because of the legal position as we accept in New Zealand (though there is some difference of opinion on this matter in certain other Dominions), it is so because the

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[4] SALMOND, J., *Relationship of Dominions to Great Britain,* in The New Zealand Year Book: 1924, Government Printer, Wellington. 1923. p.699
[5] *ibid.*

> sentiment of this country would inevitably insist on New Zealand standing shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain in such circumstances; and, even were these two reasons absent, any catastrophe that affects Great Britain must inevitably affect New Zealand also, bound up as are in the welfare of the Old Country.[6]

Forbes in this statement reinforced the notion that British foreign policy was, by default, New Zealand's. A country half way around the world in the South Pacific saw itself as an unofficial member of an European security pact. The reasons for this were given as the historical and cultural links to Britain, the economic dependence of New Zealand on the United Kingdom and the legal status of New Zealand in international relations.

The 'legal' position Forbes was referring to became known as the Westminster Act. The political status of New Zealand as a Dominion was set in 1926, however the legal form did not match this. The Westminster Act sought to bring the political and legal status of the Dominion into line and permit New Zealand to act independently of the United Kingdom. The Act could have been passed in New Zealand in early 1931, yet it was not. The government felt comfortable at the time with the situation and saw no reason to pass the Act into law.

However, by not adopting the Statute of Westminster, doubts were raised over the ability of the New Zealand Government to legally take external relations

[6] New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, (hereafter NZPD), *19 February 1935: volume 241.* pp.82-83

decisions independently from the United Kingdom. This reinforces the notion that New Zealand was not independent in its external affairs.

New Zealand's External Affairs 1935-1945

With the 1935 General election and the coming to power of the first Labour Government, New Zealand moved towards a more independent stance in its external affairs. This resulted from two major differences the new government had with the outgoing. These were related to the interpretation of the legal status of New Zealand and the considerable ideological difference between the governments in Wellington and London.

The Labour Government did not embrace the Westminster Act, but nonetheless considered that the political status of New Zealand allowed it to act independently. They firmly held the view that as New Zealand had a place at the League of Nations and had the right to use that position in a way that served its own interests.

Further, the incoming Labour Government was socialist in nature and held views that were in stark contrast to the conservative government in London. This was perhaps most clearly illustrated by New Zealand's approach to the League of Nations.

Labour had always been a strong supporter of the League of Nations. While in opposition it believed the League "could banish war and create a more just world,"[7] ideals which fitted nicely in with its socialist ideological platform.

In a speech reported by *The New Zealand Worker* at the King's Theatre on 16 September 1935, Walter Nash[8] said in a campaign meeting that:

> The Labour Party is solidly behind the idea of collective security. This can be best achieved through adherence to the Covenant of the League of Nations[9]

The report went on to state:

> In conclusion, Mr. Nash said the Labour Party was working towards rational and reasonable agreement between nations. New Zealand was a nation and had signed the Covenant as such. New Zealand belonged to the British Commonwealth of Nations, but was a unit in it and not a satellite behind any other unit in it. The Labour Party in New Zealand would do all that it could to uphold the Convenant of the League of Nations.[10]

The Labour Party clearly intended to take a more independent line in external affairs as borne out with the crises in Abyssinia and Spain prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.

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[7] MCKINNON, M. Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935, Auckland University Press, Auckland. 1993. p.14
[8] Senior opposition Labour MP
[9] NASH, W. in *The New Zealand Worker,* in MCINTYRE, W. & GARDNER, W. (eds.) Speeches and Documents on New Zealand History, Oxford University Press, Wellington. 1971. p.359
[10] *ibid*

The Italian invasion of Abyssinia led to the 'Hoare-Laval' proposal. This was an attempt by the United Kingdom and France to end the conflict by ceding half of Abyssinia to Italy. New Zealand would not support this proposal and indicated this to London five days after the proposal was put forward. New Zealand was concerned that if Abyssinia, a small nation (like itself), could be treated in such a way, i.e. a large state invading a small state and effectively getting away with it, it would greatly lessen the ability of the League to stop aggression in other cases.

This was far removed from the attitude of the Massey government; New Zealand was now prepared to disagree publicly with the 'Mother Country.' The New Zealand decision to support the League and its call of sanctions (short of war) against Italy was later adopted by Britain and France. It seems, that massive public opinion against the proposals in those countries forced the abandonment of the Hoare-Laval plan rather than New Zealand's opposition.

The Civil War in Spain also highlighted differences between New Zealand and United Kingdom. New Zealand felt that the overthrow of a Government, that broadly supported the same ideals as itself, by a fascist rebellion supported by Germany and Italy was a matter the League should be involved in, whereas the British Government felt it was a domestic issue for the Spanish to sort out. The British were also concerned with repairing relations with Italy (who were

supporting the fascists) after the affair, but this was of less importance for New Zealand.

William Jordan speaking at the League of Nations Council on 28 May 1937 stated:

> I am sure that we all feel the responsibility of the position in which we find ourselves at this table of the Council of the League of Nations. We have a definite pledge with a purpose. The eyes of the world are on the Council at this time. Whatever the matter in dispute may be, whatever the cause of the conflict, the people of the world are shocked at the dreadful happening in Spain, and the situation at the present time surely calls for some action.
>
> ...As it is a function of the League to safeguard the lives of people, to maintain peace, and to uphold lawful and constitutional Governments against invasion and the violence of outside powers, it is undoubtedly time that some decision in the Spanish situation was taken if the League is going to act at all in this matter...[11]

Again New Zealand was prepared to voice its own opinion on the world stage even though this meant taking a different position to that of the United Kingdom. New Zealand had also broadened its external affairs 'horizons' from simply following the line set in London; a trend that continued in September 1939 with the start of the Second World

[11] Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1937-8 A-5b pp32-3

New Zealand's conduct during the Second World War differed significantly from that of the First World War (1914-18). Of prime importance, New Zealand independently declared war on Germany informing the United Kingdom that:

> His Majesty's Government in New Zealand desire immediately to associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom...The existence of a state of war with Germany has accordingly been proclaimed in New Zealand...[12]

On 5 September 1939, the Prime Minister spoke to New Zealand on radio announcing that New Zealand was at war:

> I am satisfied that nowhere will the issue [the destruction of Nazism] be more clearly understood than in New Zealand – where for almost a century, behind the sure shield of Britain, we have enjoyed and cherished freedom and self-government. Both with gratitude for the past, and with confidence in the future, we range ourselves without fear beside Britain. Where she goes, we go, where she stands, we stand. We are only small and young nation, but we are one and all a band of brothers, and we march forward with a union of hearts and wills to a common destiny.[13]

Although aligning very much with the United Kingdom in declaring war against Germany, New Zealand it did so of its own choice, although not surprisingly, the decision-makers in both London and Wellington had the same view with regard to the action to be taken.

[12] GOVERNOR GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND to SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS, *telegram: 4 September 1939,* in DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, Documents Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War: 1939-45: volume one, (hereafter Documents: volume one), Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington. 1949. p.6

In sending its forces overseas on this occasion New Zealand, for the most part, kept tighter control over its forces than it had done previously in either the Boer War (1899-1901) or the First World War (1914-1918). Specifically the Commanding Officer of the 2nd NZ Division, General Freyberg, was given the following instructions on 5 January 1940 with respect to the employment of the 2nd New Zealand Division:

> The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the instructions he receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose command he is serving, subject only to the requirements of His Majesty's Government in New Zealand.[14]

As a single entity the 2nd New Zealand Division was the most visible part of New Zealand's war effort, embodying much of the New Zealand concern and determination. Accordingly, the New Zealand Government was anxious to see it was used, and supported, properly. Members of the Government were also well aware of the horrendous losses New Zealand forces had experienced in the First World War and did not want this repeated. The New Zealand Division was effectively New Zealand's national army, unlike the other Allied wartime divisions, which were for the most part, simply elements of a larger national force. If the 2nd NZ Division was not in theatre, New Zealand was not in theatre, if the division suffered horrendous losses, the whole of New Zealand suffered accordingly. The majority of New Zealand's eggs were in this basket.

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[13] SAVAGE, M. *Broadcast to the Nation: 5 September 1939*, in Documents: volume one. p.1

This desire to keep control over a large proportion of its forces[15] again illustrates that New Zealand was not content to accept British policy unconditionally. It wanted to decide for itself the role that the New Zealand forces would play.

Theoretical approach

As a small state, New Zealand had to (and still does) decide how it could best exert influence over larger states.

David Vital argued in 'The Inequality of States,' that there are three possible strategies that a small state can pursue in its external affairs policies: the passive, active and defensive. In summary, these are

> **Passive.** The struggle to maintain freedom of choice in the external world is explicitly or implicitly renounced... It implies acquiescence in the fact (or belief) that the state is not viable as an independent international entity.
>
> **Active.** [I]s designed to alter the external environment of the state to its advantage either by
>
> a) reducing the discrepancy in strength between the state and the external forces that matter; or by

[14] FRASER, P. to FREYBERG, B., *telegram: 5 January 1940,* in Documents: volume one. p.2
[15] However, New Zealand Naval and air contributions in Europe remained under British control.

b) widening the limits of freedom of political choice and manoeuvre; or else by
c) increasing the total resources of the state, and therefore strengthening the safe base by *external* increment.

Scope for adoption and execution of such a strategy is clearly small

Defensive. [Is] designed, in essence, to preserve the status quo, relying on strength through *internal* increment.[16]

This thesis will argue that New Zealand followed an active strategy throughout the 1942-52 period. It was not prepared to be "...a mere pawn in the game of the great ones," and hence acted accordingly. Applying this theory to the security aspect of New Zealand's external relation policy, this thesis will examine the following hypotheses:

H1 That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when deciding its external affairs policy.

H2 That New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first and not another country.

H3 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relation goals.

[16] *ibid.* p.121

Structure

This thesis is divided into four parts. (i)The above introduction, which included a brief overview of New Zealand's external affairs policy during the period 1918-1942, (ii and iii) two case studies of specific importance to New Zealand's security covering the 1942-52 period and (iv) a conclusion. The introduction has introduced the topic of the thesis and has also provided an overview of New Zealand's external affairs policy during the period of study to provide some background to the case studies. It also outlined the hypotheses of this thesis and the manner they will be examined. The next two chapters are the case studies, which will be examined with reference with the stated hypotheses. The fourth and final chapter embraces the conclusion.

This conclusion will:

- Summarise the information gathered for this thesis.
- Compare the hypotheses to the results of the research
- Compare the foreign policy path taken by New Zealand in the three case studies with the policy options suggested by Vital.

Chapter Two:

The Pacific War & the Surrender and Occupation of Japan

Introduction

This chapter examines New Zealand's participation in the Pacific War, and specifically the employment of ground forces and to a lesser degree naval and air forces, the surrender and occupation of Japan at the end of the Second World War and, in particular, the degree of independence shown by New Zealand during this period. New Zealand's experience at this time is a useful example of the problems small states can have in achieving external affairs goals when dealing with much larger nations.

The first part of the chapter will look into the decision not to deploy the 2nd NZ Division in the Pacific theatre from the Middle East despite the threat posed to New Zealand. The second part will address the difficulties both New Zealand and Australia experienced to become signatories to the surrender on 2 September 1945. The third will discuss New Zealand's involvement in both the Far Eastern Commission and the occupation of Japan. The fourth and final part of this chapter will evaluate the success of New Zealand's approach and its

policies and compare these with Vital's 'small state policy directions,' as stated in his book 'The Inequality of Small States.'

This chapter will show that New Zealand acted throughout this period as an independent nation and did not simply 'follow the Mother country' in policy. Evidence from the relative government documents, covering New Zealand's attitude toward the Pacific War and the surrender and occupation of Japan clearly demonstrate this.

The Japanese attack on the United States naval base of Pearl Harbour on 7 December signalled the beginning of the Pacific phase of the Second World War. As with the outbreak of the war with Germany, New Zealand independently declared war on Japan, informing the United Kingdom of the decision on 9 December 1941.

The war in the Pacific started disastrously for the allies. As well as the decimation of the United States Navy at Pearl Harbour, the Royal Navy lost both the battleship HMS *Prince of Wales* and the battle cruiser HMS *Repulse* on 10 December. This was followed by a rapid advance of Japanese forces down the Malayan Peninsula and the loss of Singapore on 15 February 1942. The Philippines fell three months later in May 1942.

The Imperial defence system upon which New Zealand had hitherto relied had clearly failed to prevent Japan entering the war against the allies, and as their advance continued the deficiencies of the system became even more apparent. Indeed, doubts rapidly surfaced as to whether the Imperial system could work at all. The United Kingdom, upon whom the whole system was based, seemed very much committed in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe with little spare capacity for operations further afield. The New Zealand Herald recognised this on 29 January 1942, as noted by F Wood:

> ...the *New Zealand Herald* commented bitterly on Churchill's statement that 'while facing Germany and Italy we never had sufficient arms to provide effectively for the defence of the Far East.' Why, then, asked the *Herald*, had the countries now menaced by Japan not been told of this and why had India, Australia and New Zealand been "allowed to continue the despatch of fighting-men to the Middle East and to Britain?'[17]

Although understandable in the context of the time, the comment is, on reflection, a little harsh. It is true the Imperial system had to some extent failed, but it then it had never visualised the need to fight a truly 'world war.' Further, although alarmed at the Japanese advance in the Pacific, the United Kingdom was concerned with the former's advance on India. They did not believe that New Zealand and Australia were directly threatened by invasion, and if that became a possibility, the United Kingdom was prepared to enter the Pacific war

[17] WOOD, F., The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs, Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington. 1958. p.209

in a much larger capacity. The United Kingdom's wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote:

> It was however always understood that if Japan invaded Australia or New Zealand the Middle East should be sacrificed to the defence of our own kith and kin. This contingency we all regarded as remote and improbable because of the vast abundance of easier and more attractive conquests offered to Japan by Malaya, Siam and above all the Dutch East Indies.[18]

With Japan's entry into the war and its rapid advance southwards, a direct threat to both Australia and New Zealand was considered likely by both countries. Accordingly, the Australians recalled their 9th Division to fight to their north in the Western Pacific. New Zealand harboured similar thoughts. New Zealand's Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs Peter Fraser sent a telegram to Prime Minister Churchill on 19 November 1942:

> I feel that the time has come when I must raise with you the question of the return from the Middle East of the 2nd New Zealand Division. In doing so I assure you that I am fully aware of the exigencies of the war situation both in this part of the world and in the North African theatre... ...Here in the Pacific...we are faced... with the possibility that Japan may launch offensive action...It is felt that the place of the 2nd New Zealand division...is here in the South Pacific.[19]

Churchill replied that:

[18] CHURCHILL, W. The Second World War: volume Three: The Grand Alliance, Cassell & Co. Ltd. London. 1950. p.523

> It would cause me much regret to see the New Zealand Division quit the scene of its glories. But I quite understand your feelings.[20]

However, it was made clear (by sending a copy of a telegram Churchill had sent to the Australian Prime Minister) that the logistics of transporting the 2nd NZ Div. to the Pacific and getting it ready for action in that theatre would cause major disruption to allied operations.

It was also pointed out that the removal of the New Zealand division would require replacement with an American or British equivalent after a further one had been found for the 9th Australian.

Neither did the United States of America want the New Zealand forces moved home. Brigadier Williams[21] stated that:

> The United States Chiefs of Staff spoke bluntly against the move. Marshall [Chief of Staff, US Army] stated that he was fully convinced that the defence of Australia and New Zealand would be weakened by the return of these divisions at this stage. The Combined Staffs were now hard put to find ships for movements already approved. Lack of ships was preventing the reinforcement of Burma and the Far East, where operations under consideration would put troops in contact with the enemy. This would have important repercussions on the defence of Australia and New Zealand. He appreciated the points advanced but

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[19] FRASER, P. to CHURCHILL, W., *telegram: 19 November 1942,* in Documents two, p.142
[20] CHURCHILL, W., to FRASER, P., *telegram: 24 November 1942*, in Documents: volume two, p.145
[21] New Zealand Army representative on the British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, February 1942-Ocober 1943

> expressed grave concern regarding military implications which impeded the war effort as a whole.[22]

In the end, New Zealand elected to keep the Division in the African and European theatres, and although this coincided with British (and American) hopes, it was by no means a rubber stamp exercise. A secret session of the House of Representatives on 3 December 1942 debated this issue at length before deciding not to relocate the 2nd NZ Division. Accordingly, Fraser sent a telegram to Churchill on 4 December saying:

> The facts set out in your telegram under reply and the dangers involved in attempting in the present circumstances to move the 2nd New Zealand Division have greatly impressed us, and we have come to the conclusion – unanimously shared by all my colleagues and by all the members of the House of Representatives – that we cannot take the responsibility, in the circumstances that you outline, of pressing for the return of the New Zealand troops at this juncture.[23]

While it might be argued that New Zealand simply bowed to its larger allies, it is perhaps much fairer to acknowledge the decision to leave the 2nd Division *in situ* was a pragmatic one taken by Wellington, especially given the circumstances at the time. Had New Zealand insisted on following Australia's lead then undoubtedly it could have done so, but the reasons against were plainly stated, and in turn accepted by the government of the day in Wellington. The commonly held view that Britain 'forced' New Zealand to stay and fight in North Africa and

[22] BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., *telegram: 5 December 1942*, in Documents: volume two, p.149

the Mediterranean has no foundation. It was quite reasonable for both the United Kingdom and the United States to provide their perceptions and views, but to suggest this constituted coercion or force is clearly unreasonable.

Despite the United Kingdom's confidence in New Zealand's security, New Zealand was facing the prospect, for the first time since the Russian scare of the 1880's, of fighting close in its own region rather than far away in Europe or Africa.[24]

However, notwithstanding the decision to retain the Division in Africa, New Zealand did participate in the Pacific War under United States command. The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) was heavily involved in the Pacific theatre having thirteen squadrons in action against Japanese forces and a total of seven thousand personnel in theatre by wars end.[25] They were heavily involved in the Guadalcanal, Solomon Island, Rabaul and Bougainville operations with the last combat operation taking place on 3 August 1945. There was also a Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) presence in the region. The Leander class cruisers HMNZS *Achilles* and HMNZS *Leander* were involved in escort duties in support of the allied Pacific effort as well as operations at Guadalcanal and the Solomons. Later the *Achilles* would join the Fiji class cruiser HMNZS *Gambia* in the British Fleet in operations against the Japanese

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[23] FRASER, P to CHURCHILL, W., *telegram: 4 December 1942*, in Documents; volume two, p.148

home islands. For a short time, a two brigade second army division, the 3rd NZ Division[26] was raised and saw action in the Solomons and the Green Islands.

Although not necessary identified at the time, the commitment of these forces to fight alongside the United States of America, who clearly bore the burden of the responsibility for the Pacific, marked a significant change in New Zealand's defence relationships. Identification was much later in coming

The Japanese Surrender

With the war drawing to an end after four years of bitter fighting, New Zealand and Australia were now worried that despite playing a part in the defeat of Japan, they were not to be included in the negotiations to end the war.

This concern was justified as neither country was invited to the conferences held to formulate the defeat, and ultimately the surrender terms, of Germany and Japan. The Cairo Declaration (1 December 1943) and the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) were the domain of the major powers: the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China (in Cairo).

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[24] There had been the appearance of the odd German raider in the South Pacific as well as the occupation of Samoa during the First World War, these were however, minor compared to the huge size of the two world wars.
[25] WRIGHT, M. Kiwi Air Power: The History of the RNZAF, Reed, Auckland. 1998. p.81
[26] 3NZ Div. was formed May 1943, however the strain on New Zealand's resources of supporting two full Divisions was beyond it.

With this increasingly frustrating situation, the Australian External Affairs Minister Dr. Evatt[27] suggested in the Australian House Representatives that an international conference be held to consider the problems of defence, post war development in the South West and South Pacific.[28] Other issues to be discussed included 'native' welfare, economics and trade, air routes and communications. The New Zealand High Commissioner in Australia, Carl Berendsen reported to Fraser on 21 October 1943 that Evatt:

> ...wishes to hold this conference (probably in Australia) if possible before Christmas. He attaches the utmost importance to this subject and considers Australia and New Zealand in co-operation should be the foundation of the British sphere of influence in the South-West and the South Pacific and that the future safety and prosperity of these two Dominions depend on their having a decisive voice in these areas. He would favour preliminary discussion between Australia and New Zealand only, which he would like to see take place as soon as this could be conveniently arranged...He thinks it desirable (?and) essential that Australia and New Zealand should be in a position to play a predominant part in future of these areas and he considers these two Dominions particularly qualified to do so by their special knowledge and experience. He feels that the joint Australian and New Zealand policy on this matter might well be expected to prevail.[29]

[27] Australian Minister for External Affairs
[28] BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., *telegram: 21 October 1943,* in KAY, R. (ed.) Documents on New Zealand External Relations: volume one: The Australian New Zealand Agreement 1944, (hereafter KAY(ed.) volume one), Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington. 1972. p.47
[29] *ibid*

Australia was hoping that by putting forward a united front, both itself and New Zealand would be in a better position to exert influence over the future direction of the region.

Wellington agreed and replied on 30 October that New Zealand would welcome the opportunity to take part in preliminary discussions with Australia. This was approved by Cabinet on 26 November and after negotiations, the date of the Australian –New Zealand talks was set to commence on 17 January 1944.

When the New Zealand delegation arrived in Australia, they were given a series of prepared papers by the Australians on the issues to be discussed. The delegation reported that New Zealand was in agreement with 75 percent of the items on the agenda and hence there was no need for discussions on these in detail.[30] New Zealand to its surprise found that Australia wanted a formal agreement at the end of the talks. As the delegation reported afterwards:

> Until we arrived at the Conference and in fact not until some time after proceedings had commenced was it known that the Australians were anxious for the Conference to be concluded by the making of a formal Agreement. All we had in mind up until then was a straightforward talk on the matters comprising the agenda and an understanding of the attitude to be adopted by both countries on subjects of the moment to us and in which we were jointly concerned. We had the idea that this could be met merely by a formal acceptance of the record of the proceedings. Mr. Curtin[31] and his Ministers, however, at first sought the

[30] *Report of the New Zealand Delegation on the Australian – New Zealand Conference, January 1944*, in KAY(ed.) volume one, p.67
[31] PM of Australia

> completion of a solemn Treaty or Pact. This was objected to first on the grounds of our inability to negotiate such a document and secondly on the grounds that it might create considerable misunderstanding. Finally the Prime Minister agreed to sign an Agreement setting out the objectives of the Dominion and the Commonwealth on questions on which we had a single mind and recording the means which we proposed to adopt for future collaboration and co-operation.[32]

In the Canberra Pact, as it became known, New Zealand and Australia agreed to closely consult each other on issues to do with external affairs and where possible to ensure they presented to the outside world a united stance on matters that concerned them. There was strong emphasis on both countries being given the respect and influence in relation to issues in the south-west and South Pacific from the larger powers, (primarily the United States and the United Kingdom). As well as security, defence, the shape of the post war world and relations with other nations, a united stance on issues such as civil aviation, migration, dependencies and territories, welfare and advancement of the 'native' peoples of the Pacific were negotiated. There was also a call for an international Conference relating to the South West and south Pacific.

New Zealand and Australia certainly with this agreement stated publicly that they saw themselves as participants in the South-West and South Pacific and if any decisions were to be made concerning this area, they had a right to be involved and have their views taken into account. However, the Agreement worked out by Canberra was effectively just a joint policy statement by Australia

[32] *ibid*. p.67

and New Zealand coupled with an understanding that the two countries should work closely together when formulating any future policies. The Agreement was not a major milestone in the development of New Zealand's external affairs policy as it simply was a continuation of the desire to be seen on the world stage as an independent nation.

The Agreement failed in its objective to gain an 'ANZAC' voice in Pacific affairs, and as New Zealand initially worried, did cause considerable misunderstanding with both the United Kingdom and the United States.

London was worried that the two Dominions were embarking on a new policy path without even informing the United Kingdom. Indeed one British Official[33] referred to it as the 'Anzaxis' pact[34] forcing New Zealand to reassure London that it was not being excluded from Wellington's future plans.'

The United States was concerned at Clause sixteen of the Agreement which suggested that foreign powers (i.e. the United States) did not have the rights of sovereignty over land used for military installations during the war after the conclusion of hostilities. Fraser again had to explain, this time to Washington, that the United States was indeed welcome in the region and New Zealand and Australia were not seeking their withdrawal from the South West and South Pacific.

[33] Richard Sedwick, Official Secretary, British High Commission, Wellington

Notwithstanding, New Zealand, which viewed itself as an independent country that had declared war on Japan, and for that matter Germany, expected to be included in the closing formalities. Not only had it contributed a sizeable force against Japan already committed to supporting a large military presence in North Africa and Italy, but also it had supplied at considerable effort food for both Great Britain and the United States forces in the prosecution of the war. Additionally, after the defeat of Germany New Zealand was prepared to offer the 2nd New Zealand Division, the RNZAF (which would have been significantly larger in both terms of squadrons in theatre and personnel as a result of the influx of aircraft and New Zealand crews from the RAF) and the ships RNZN fighting with the RN in the Pacific, over fifty thousand men from all three services to Operation Cornet – the invasion of mainland Japan.[35] With all this, it deserved to be heard.

As indicated earlier, New Zealand's involvement in the Pacific differed from its other military deployments in the sense that the United States rather than the United Kingdom was the major ally. There is a certain amount of irony in this. New Zealand had been willing so often in its past to fight for the United Kingdom, a great power, yet when it appeared that New Zealand was threatened, the United Kingdom was simply not 'great' enough to send any meaningful force. It had been left to the United States to stop the Japanese. The 'sun was setting on the Empire.'

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[34] MCINTOSH, A. to BERENDSEN, C., *letter: 3 February 1944*, in MCGIBBON, I. Undiplomatic Dialogue. p.61

Irrespective of the practicalities of the situation, the readiness of New Zealand to 'leave the nest' so to speak and fight without the United Kingdom is worthy of record. While New Zealand realised that it was in its best interest to leave the 2nd NZ Division in the Middle Eastern theatre, it was not prepared to leave the Pacific fighting entirely to others. New Zealand would do its share, even if that meant fighting without Britain for the first time. Yet it seemed its contribution did not automatically confer a seat at the conference table.

On the 27 July 1945, Evatt wrote to his New Zealand counterpart Fraser in Wellington, in relation to the Postdam conference:

> In respect of certain matters discussed at Potsdam including the proposed Council of Foreign Ministers, disposition of ex-enemy territories, disposal of German navy and merchant marine, and treatment of Italy, it is of vital importance to repeat that from Australia's point of view having regard to our total war effort and heavy sacrifices in European and Pacific theatres of war we should not either directly or indirectly be deprived of full right of participation as principals in framing the terms of peace in relation to our European and East Asian enemies. United Kingdom Government has frequently recognised that Australia and other Dominions fully possess this right. But right is valueless unless it can be effectively exercised and this requires full opportunities as principles to press [present?] views concerning peace arrangements in Europe and armistice and peace arrangements in Pacific and to do so face to face with all concerned in decisions at sufficiently early stage to give chance of such views proving effective

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[35] Documents: volume three

> ....3. As recently as Commonwealth meeting in London we sought and received undertakings that the Dominions would participate as principals in peace conference [which] would be held. We also received undertaking from Mr Churchill that Australia and New Zealand would participate in all matters relating to conclusion of armistices in Far East and participate also as principals. .[36]

The telegram went on to state what Churchill's undertakings were:

> "Mr Churchill said that he wholly sympathised and that he thought President [Roosevelt][37] was always extremely fair and would agree. He did not think that President would tolerate exclusion of Australia and New Zealand from conclusion of armistices in Far East. They should certainly participate...Mr Fraser and Dr Evatt could rest assured that he would support Australia's and New Zealand's claims with all influence that he could use.[38]

Evatt sent another telegram to New Zealand the next day further expressing his view that it was vital for Australia and New Zealand to be included in the peace settlement:

> ...there are some people who do not realise that the post-war security of the peoples of Australia and New Zealand, and of India too, are integrally bound up with the destiny of South-East Asia and are therefore directly dependant upon terms of the peace settlement with Japan."[39]

[36] EVATT, H. to FRASER., *telegram: 27 July 1945*, in KAY, R. (ed.), Documents on New Zealand External Relations: volume two; The Surrender and Occupation of Japan, (hereafter KAY (ed.) volume two), Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington. pp.18-19
[37] Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, three days after this discussion.
[38] EVATT, H. to FRASER, P., *telegram: 27 July 1945,* in Documents two, p.20
[39] EVATT, H. to FRASER, P. *telegram: 30 August 1945, ibid.* p.24

Australia was clearly concerned at being left out of any negotiations. It had pulled back a large majority of its forces from the Middle East to fight the Japanese, had sustained considerable casualties in the fighting, and had suffered from considerable Japanese air attacks, particularly on Darwin. They felt their security had been threatened and they did not want their concerns about the future being ignored.

These views were mirrored in New Zealand. One week after receiving the Australian messages, Fraser, wrote to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in the United Kingdom:

> ...I feel that I should record at this stage however the fact that I share Dr Evatt's regret that the Potsdam *communiqué* to Japan was issued without previous consultation with Australia and New Zealand who have actively participated in the war in the Far East and who are so vitally interested in the nature of the peace settlement with Japan.[40]

New Zealand also sent a telegram to Australia on the 4 August 1945 agreeing with their telegram of 27 July. Clearly neither country was prepared to just 'go along' with the major powers. They (Australia and New Zealand) had entered the war as independent countries, had been directly threatened by Japan, had fully participated in the war and both felt they had 'earned' the right to participate in the surrender.

[40] FRASER, P. to ADDISON, *telegram: 4 August 1945* in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.27

On the 6 August 1945 the Japanese city of Hiroshima became victim of the first atomic bomb. Three days later a second devastated the city of Nagasaki. On 12 August the Japanese agreed to the declaration and on 14 August the allies accepted the Japanese position. The war had ended abruptly.

On 8 August the United Kingdom solicited New Zealand's views on a peace treaty. However, after Nagasaki on the 13 August, the United States had a change of heart and asked for a New Zealand representative to be present at the surrender of Japan. It appeared that New Zealand would indeed be represented in the peace negotiations and, along with Australia, its concerns were to be allayed.

However, the initial fears of both New Zealand and Australia materialised two days later. On 15 August the United Kingdom informed New Zealand the United States would not consult with anybody else on the text of the surrender document:

> ...State Department said...that the United States Government are not in a position to consult their allies about the Act of Surrender... State Department explained the reason why the United States Government was unwilling to enter into formal consultations with United Kingdom Government was that they did not intend to invite comments of Soviet or Chinese governments.[41]

[41] ADDISON to FRASER, P. *telegram: 14 August 1945, ibid.* p.*62*

Despite representations from the United Kingdom on New Zealand's behalf, the United States would not grant New Zealand, or the other Dominions, independent status at the signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan:

> State Department have replied to our representations that whilst willing that Admiral Fraser should be accompanied by General Blamey [Commander in Chief, Australian military forces] and other Dominion officers concerned, United States Government do not (repeat not) see their way to granting them independent status.[42]

Practically there was very little that either New Zealand or Australia could do. With size and might the United States could dictate what other countries, in particular smaller ones like New Zealand, could achieve. On 24 August 1945, Prime Minister Fraser lamented in the House of Representatives on the situation New Zealand was in:

> ...Up to the present time the indications are that neither Australia nor New Zealand will be signatories to the terms of surrender by Japan. So far, it would seem that those who will sign are the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, and, I think, France, but I am not so sure about the latter country. Our information, so far, is that other countries will not sign. There is no reflection on Australia or on New Zealand in that, because both countries will be represented.[43]

Fraser, in the same statement, refuted the incorrect suggestion (particularly made in some Australian newspapers and picked up by some members of the

[42] ADDISON to FRASER,P., *telegram: 16 August 1945, ibid.* p.77
[43] NZPD: volume 269, *24 August 1945.* p.282

opposition) that the United Kingdom had not pressed for New Zealand and Australia's inclusion:

> ...I am concerned to see that, above everything, our unity with the United Kingdom should be maintained. That is the important matter- unity with the United Kingdom; and I hope hat no member on either side of this House will say anything that will give even the semblance of divergence between this country and the United Kingdom in matters of foreign policy...I hope the smaller will be taken more and more closer into closer equality with the larger nations, but the position, unfortunately, at San Francisco, and earlier at Teheran, at Yalta, and at Berlin is just the opposite. The great nations have the greatest power. We knew what power they did have, and, with the atomic bomb, that realization on our part is greater. They are predominant in the world at the present time. We have to realise that and make the best of it; the main thing is that Australia and New Zealand have been close together. We have taken up the same attitude. We have protested against any exclusion which does not give us equality in the Pacific. So long as this Government is in office, we are not going to quarrel with the Mother-country, even if the Mother country cannot extend the equality she would like to extend to us.[44]

Fraser was reflecting on the dilemma New Zealand was in. Its 'champion,' the United Kingdom, was no longer the dominant figure in international affairs anymore: the United States now held that place. In the absence of a comparative relationship to that with the United Kingdom, New Zealand had little influence with the United States. There was some credit due through New Zealand's Pacific involvement, but this seemed insufficient, and along with

[44] *ibid*

Australia they were to be left out in the cold. The fledgling United Nations was not an effective body and help could not be expected from that direction.

Thus the dilemma of small states when dealing with larger ones. That is, larger states determine the degree of participation the smaller can play. In this case the United States decided it did not need to take other nations into account, especially a couple of small ones like Australia and New Zealand.

As it was, the United States had altered its position. A press report emerged from the Philippine capital Manila, coincidentally on the same day as Fraser's statement, quoting Admiral Nimitz as saying that along with the United States, the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union, Australia, the Netherlands, Canada and New Zealand were to be the signatories to the surrender document. New Zealand was also going to be allowed to participate in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC). The pressure bought to bear by the United Kingdom and the protests from Australia and New Zealand on the United States had helped change its mind. There was also another factor that may have influenced the United States decision: the indication given by Australia and New Zealand that they were willing to contribute to the occupation of Japan after the surrender.

The Far Eastern Commission

Between the 15 and 24 August 1945 New Zealand was informed it would be allowed to be present at the surrender, but would not be a signatory. During this period, New Zealand had decided to pursue the option of sending a military force to Japan as part of the occupation and on the 16 August instructed General Freyberg to prepare for such a possibility.

Following the unconditional surrender of Japan on board the USS *Missouri*, the victorious allies had then to decide how to deal with their defeated enemy. New Zealand wanted to be part of the process that decided the post-war fate of Japan. Having confronted the possibility of invasion less than three years earlier New Zealand was obviously keen to prevent that from happening again. As has already been shown, Wellington saw itself as independent and therefore wanted its own voice in any settlement.

As a participant in the war against Japan, New Zealand was asked by the United States on 8 October to be part of the Commission. New Zealand put forward Carl Berendsen as its representative. This was an obvious move as the FEC was to be based in Washington and as he was now New Zealand's Minister in the United States, Berendsen had extensive experience in dealing with Washington as well as being his country's pre-eminent diplomat.

The Far Eastern Commission was established

...for the consideration of political matters connected with the fulfilment by Japan with its obligations under the instrument of surrender.[45]

The functions of the FEC, as laid out in a *communiqué* made on 28 December 1945 were as follows:

II *Functions*

A The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be:

1. To formulate the polices, principles and the standards in conformity with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender may be accomplished.
2. To review on the request of any member any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by the Supreme Commander involving the policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission. To consider such matters as may be assigned to it by agreement among the principal governments reached in accordance with the voting procedure in Article V-2 hereunder.

B The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the conduct of military operations nor with the regard to territorial adjustments.

III Functions of the United States Government

1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in accordance with the policy decisions of the Commission and shall transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate United States Government agency. The Supreme Commander shall be charged with implementation of the directives which express the policy decisions of the Commission.

V Composition

2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote provided that the action shall have the concurrence of at least a majority of all the representatives including the representatives of

[45] CHILDS, P. to FRASER, P. *letter 8 October 1945* in KAY (ed.) volume two, p.216

> the four of the following powers: United States of America, United Kingdom, USSR and China.[46]

The members of the Commission at this stage were the USSR, United Kingdom, United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, India, the Philippines and New Zealand. The United States had realised that it alone could not expect to 'run the show' all by itself (as it had with the Japanese surrender) and would take into account the other allied powers.

Yet in setting up the FEC the major powers severely handicapped the Commission, and in particular the role the smaller powers such as Australia and New Zealand could play. This was through the power of veto, which the United States, United Kingdom, the USSR and China had bestowed upon themselves. The consequences of this, particularly with the actions of the United States, would reveal themselves as time progressed.

However, it would be fair to say that at this time this power was not a problem for New Zealand. The reason was that New Zealand did not actually have a policy to put forward! McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 10 October 1945 saying that:

> It is regrettable that we have no policy or, for that matter, any definite views on the Japanese settlement, but the Prime Minister is firmly

[46] CRANBOURNE to FRASER, P. *Text of communiqué on Moscow meeting between US, UK & USSR 28 December, telegram :27 August 1945*, in KAY(ed.)volume two, p.281-2

> convinced that our policy, such as it is, will be well-known to you consequently no definite instructions will be needed.[47]

The lack of a specific policy was quickly overcome in Wellington and the FEC undertook its first actions with a tour of war ravaged Japan where, on 29 January 1946 they had the opportunity to have a lengthy discussion with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers(SCAP), General MacArthur. Berendsen reported that MacArthur saw himself as the servant of the all the governments in the FEC and he would be willing to implement the policy directives given by FEC. However, he stressed that it was important that there be only one allied control mechanism, i.e. SCAP.[48] The FEC accepted MacArthur at his word and did not seek to set up any parallel authorities in Japan. The result was SCAP had total control in and over Japan. Dominating personality aside, this lack of balance coupled with the fact that the FEC was based in Washington and not in Japan itself, placed the FEC at a distinct disadvantage when trying to have its policies implemented. If SCAP decided to follow a particular course, there was very little recourse for the FEC as there were no alternative mechanism through which it could act.

The British Commonwealth Occupation Force

[47] MCINTOSH, A. to BERENDSEN, C.*LETTER: 10 October 1945*, in MCGIBBON,I in Undiplomatic Dialouge, p.101

The second 'string to New Zealand's bow" was a commitment by New Zealand to participate in the military occupation of the newly defeated Japan. On the 16 August, General Freyberg had been instructed to prepare a New Zealand force for such a deployment and on the 21 August, New Zealand agreed in principle to contributing to what would become known as the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF)

The BCOF was to be made up of British, Australian, Indian and New Zealand forces (Canada had declined to participate) and it was to be based in the south-western tip of the island of Honshu in southern Japan, with the New Zealand brigade being responsible for the Yamaguchi prefecture. No.14 Squadron RNZAF also deployed as part of a tactical air force for the BCOF although it was separate from the land force deployment. Laurie Brocklebank in his book *Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan 1945-1948* stated there were three roles for the New Zealanders' to perform:

> The first role was...'[m]ilitary control of [a designated] area and demilitarisation and destruction of equipment, arms and other defences'. Second, MacArthur [Supreme Commander Allied Powers] wanted the British Commonwealth forces to promote democracy among the Japanese. Third, enhancing the prestige of the Commonwealth, particularly for Peter Fraser [New Zealand's Prime Minister].[49]

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[48] BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P. *Report on the FEC: January 1946*, in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.326

[49] BROCKLEBANK, L. Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan 1945-1948, Oxford University Press, Auckland. 1997. p.125

On the 30 September 1945 (printed in *The Dominion*, 1 October) Prime Minister Peter Fraser stated that New Zealand was giving serious consideration to participating in a Commonwealth occupation force in Japan. In the rationale he gave for New Zealand being involved, he emphasised the country's link to the United Kingdom, as well as the need for New Zealand to 'play its part':

> "I feel sure, "said Mr Fraser, "That the people of New Zealand will agree that the opportunity of proving our unity and solidarity with the Mother country, and of sharing in the responsibilities of the British Commonwealth in the Pacific, should be accepted by the provision of a brigade group as requested by the United Kingdom Government.
> .... Indeed Mr Attlee said in his original message, 'We trust that we may rely on your assistance and indeed we regard your assistance as indispensable."
> ..."It will be generally agreed also that our only enemy in the Pacific is Japan and her surrender does not of itself ensure freedom from future Japanese aggression. To render this impossible it is necessary to disarm Japan, to dismantle her war industries and, as far as possible, to eradicate the spirit of Japanese militarism".
> ..."It is clearly our duty...to undertake our share of the responsibility for the enforcement of the peace, to the achievement of which our war effort has made a notable contribution. If, moreover, the peace settlement with Japan should fail, New Zealand may well be one of the first countries to suffer."[50]

Fraser, in the statement above, gave three reasons for New Zealand's involvement. The first was loyalty to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, the second, the disarming of Japan and the third the country's duty to enforce the peace and protect the security of the region.

[50] FRASER, P. *statement*, in KAY(ed.) volume two, pp.1287-1288

It is true New Zealand still viewed the United Kingdom with a great deal of affection and loyalty. For example, the Statute of Westminster[51] had not yet been adopted by New Zealand despite the fact it had been available since 1931.[52]

As Ann Trotter wrote in *New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952: The Occupation and the Peace Treaty*:

> Psychological attachments [to the United Kingdom] had been strengthened by victory and wartime sacrifice in spite of the fact of demonstrated British weakness in the Pacific.[53]

Yet this loyalty is not the principal reason why New Zealand joined the BCOF. The issue of regional security dominated and despite the recent disappointment and failure over the United Kingdom policies in the Pacific the latter was still considered the main guarantor of New Zealand's interests. But this was tempered with the realisation that as the United Kingdom struggled with the aftermath of the war, Britain might not be totally enthusiastic about Pacific security.

This was of concern to New Zealand and the BCOF was seen as a way of encouraging the United Kingdom to stay in the Pacific. New Zealand saw its

[51] The Statute of Westminster would have formalised New Zealand's independence from the United Kingdom.
[52] BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.8
[53] TROTTER,A. New Zealand and Japan: The Occupation and the Peace Treaty, Althone Press, London. 1990. pp.1-2

participation in the BCOF as a way of keeping the Pacific, and hence New Zealand's, security to the forefront of the United Kingdom's thinking.[54]

> The occupation forces offered by Britain are so small as to suggest that, for a number of reasons, she is not willing to make heavy commitments for Far Eastern and Pacific security; this present indication is a significant indication of future policy.[55]

and that:

> "...Britain needed reassurance and support if it was to remain committed to a role in the Pacific"[56]

By contributing military forces to the BCOF, New Zealand was hoping to keep the United Kingdom in the Pacific region. It certainly could not expect Britain to contribute its stretched armed forces if New Zealand was not prepared to contribute as well. The contribution was also closely linked to New Zealand's desire for Commonwealth unity in foreign and defence affairs. It certainly could not justify this desire if it did not participate actively when an opportunity such as the BCOF came along.

As well, there remained a very close association between the New Zealand and British military. It was not until the mid 1960's that the chiefs of all three New Zealand services, as well as the Chief of Defence Force were all New

[54] BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, pp.7-8
[55] CORNER, *memorandum: 21 August 1945*, in BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.8
[56] LISSINGTON, P. *Allied Control of Japan*, in BROCKLEBANK, p.8

Zealanders. Until then at least one had been on secondment from Great Britain. The United Kingdom was still viewed as New Zealand's natural defence partner. Despite the recent evidence that suggested quite the contrary, New Zealand still saw the United Kingdom as its best option for its security. The status of the RN as the second most powerful naval force in the world offered a feeling of security against the only possible threat, Japan, which had effectively no military capability left.

As Ian MacGibbon stated:

> ... participation in the British Commonwealth security system was 'so fundamental a requirement' that comment was 'scarcely needed[57]

A second reason given by Fraser was a strong desire to have a greater role in the final peace treaty with Japan. New Zealand was effectively being ignored by the United States and the United Kingdom was having very little success in pushing either New Zealand's or Australia's claims to be involved (it was having a hard enough time getting its own views listened to). Were New Zealand to contribute to the occupation, and be prepared to 'play its part,' there would be a greater chance it would have a say in the Japanese peace settlement. When Fraser said "It is our policy...to undertake our share of the enforcement of the peace," he was simply continuing New Zealand's policy of 'independence' that had started with the election of his government in 1935.

New Zealand was not prepared to go along simply with what the great powers said, yet Fraser in particular realised that with independence came responsibilities. If New Zealand wanted to be treated as an independent country it had to be prepared to act like one. In this case, this required contributing to the occupation of Japan.

Also linked to this desire for independence was the realisation that the United States of America was dominating the situation with Japan, but might not handle the situation adequately for New Zealand. Specifically, the United States would not be hard enough on the newly defeated Japanese.[58]

If New Zealand wanted to avoid a 'soft' peace treaty being forced through by the United States it would need to be part of the peace negotiations. Berendsen said that if New Zealand wanted to have any say in the outcome of the Peace Treaty, it would be taken more seriously if they contributed to the occupation of Japan.[59]

Thus to say that New Zealand's willingness to contribute to the BCOF was simply a result of desire to please the 'Mother Country' is wrong. The affection for the United Kingdom is clear in Fraser's statements and deployment of New

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[57] MACGIBBON, I. *The Defence of New Zealand 1945-1957*, in New Zealand in World Affairs: volume one, (hereafter NZWA), Price Milburn, Wellington. 1977. p.147
[58] TOTTER, A., *Personality in Foreign Policy: Sir Carl Berendsen in Washington, :volume 20, no.2 1986* in BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.13

Zealand military personnel in the BCOF fitted in very well with this, but this affection was not the primary reason for the deployment.

Until the fall of Singapore and the virtual destruction of the British Far East Fleet, New Zealand had always fought along side the 'mother-country'. Fighting as part of a 'greater-Britain' force to secure the interests of the United Kingdom was, by default, in New Zealand's interests. An almost total economic dependence upon the United Kingdom by New Zealand, along with historical, cultural and emotional ties ensured New Zealand remained inseparable from her.

But New Zealand was now looking after its own interests first. It was New Zealand, along with Australia that was threatened by Japan and these two would be once again threatened if Japan 'rose from the ashes.' Imperial defence had failed in preventing the outbreak of the war and only the United States stopped the Japanese advance just to the north of Australia. New Zealand and Australia wanted to be there at the peace negotiations, for if the great powers did not come up with a satisfactory solution it would be New Zealand and Australia who would suffer the consequences.

Yet as previously stated, New Zealand still firmly believed the United Kingdom was still the best option for New Zealand's future security. There was no indications at this stage that the United States, the only other nation with the potential to hold this place, would provide an adequate alternative. By

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[59] FRASER, P. to ADDISON, *telegram: 30 September 1945*, in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.1288

encouraging the United Kingdom to maintain a presence in the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand was looking after its own interests and not those of the United Kingdom.

Although New Zealand's involvement with the Commonwealth occupation force also continued the trend set with its participation in the Pacific war alongside Australian and United States forces, the decision to send forces to Japan was not an effort to try and convince the United States to provide a security guarantee for the Pacific. Brocklebank noted that New Zealand was not keen on any formal arrangement with the United States along the lines of a security pact and "that there is no evidence that agreement to participate in the occupation of Japan was motivated by a desire to obtain American security guarantees."[60]

A further practical reason New Zealand was keen to have a continued strong United Kingdom presence in the region was, rightly, a feeling that the infant United Nations system being set up, (which New Zealand did strongly support) did not as yet provide an adequate assurance of security.[61]

New Zealand was a strong supporter of the United Nations and its predecessor, the League of Nations, yet until the United Nations was in a position to offer a security:

> New Zealand continued to rely upon more limited security arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter, article 51 of

[60] BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.10

> which allowed members to enter *ad hoc* arrangements for collective security. In 1945 she looked to her traditional participation in British Commonwealth defence arrangements.[62]

Prior to the war Fraser and the Labour Government had been strong supporters of the League of Nations and the ideas of collective security, and this was to continue with the newly formed United Nations afterwards. The United Nations, however, was in no position to be a viable security guarantee. With the defeat of the Axis powers the Cold War emerged and impacted immediately in the United Nations. With the power of veto, the West and the Soviet Union effectively made the United Nations impotent as disagreements on issues governing security surfaced in the Security Council. As a result, New Zealand felt it would have to continue to rely on the old Imperial system. Because of this, it was vital for New Zealand to encourage the United Kingdom to participate fully in Imperial defence, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

The main body of 2NZEF (Japan) arrived in Kure, Japan from Italy on 19 March 1946. No.14 Squadron arrived in Kure from New Zealand four days later on the 23 March. The New Zealand forces remained in theatre and part of the BCOF until 25 November 1948 when the rear parties of 2NZEF and No.14 Squadron left for home.

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[61] MCGIBBON, I. NZWA, p.146
[62] *ibid.* p.147

However, by only the 3 April 1946 problems between SCAP and the FEC were becoming apparent. The FEC was not getting the policy initiatives suggested by SCAP until they had already been implemented[63]. The FEC was supposed to review any plan put forward by MacArthur, yet this was not happening.

An example came to the fore later in the month when New Zealand became concerned that despite chronic food shortages among the allies SCAP was authorising food shipments to Japan. Berendsen writing to the Minister of External Relations about this issue said that:

> It would appear that there is sufficient food in Japan to feed the whole population... A reliable authority recently returned from Japan, namely, Colonel Thorpe, who was the Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Section of SCAP, told the members of Committee No.4 the other day that the Japanese were almost completely unaware of the existence of a general world food shortage, so that it appears that little attempt has been made by SCAP in the last three months to remedy what appeared to be an omission in SCAP's public information policy...[64]

Berendsen also expressed misgivings about the profile the FEC was given in Japan. He was of the opinion the United States was deliberately undermining the FEC in the eyes of the Japanese:

> The difficulty is that any attempt by the Commission to assert its authority or even to exercise its proper functions tends to be played up in the local press as an attack on General MacArthur, or a criticism of

[63] BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., *Report on the FEC: 3 April 1946*, in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.360

> the United States Government. In the situation where General MacArthur and his Allied Council have full publicity, and where the United States Government can obtain the desired prominence of any of its own statements, the Commission is undoubtedly in the background in the eyes of the public in this country.[65]

As well as trouble with SCAP, Berendsen reported that the FEC was not functioning properly due to the behaviour of the United States. Writing to Fraser on 17 May he said:

> ...I am bound to say that I share with my colleagues on the Far Eastern Commission a sense of frustration and exasperation due entirely, whether for good or inadequate reasons, to the attitude of the United States representatives on the Commission...There is what we all believe to be a marked reluctance on the part of the American authorities to facilitate the functioning of the Commission, and still a marked unwillingness to provide the Commission with the necessary reports...[66]

It is apparent that on each occasion Berendsen reported to Wellington the situation for New Zealand had deteriorated a little further. The United States was not allowing the FEC to work in the way that New Zealand and the other smaller countries had hoped.

The New Zealand deployment in Japan was uneventful from the start. In terms of a military operation (i.e. the disarmament of Japan), the mission was completed by 1947. It has even been argued that there had never been a

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[64] BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P. *Report on the FEC: 29 April 1946, ibid.* p.379
[65] *ibid.* pp.379-380

'military' job to do in the first place.[67] Japan had been completely devastated by the war and was in no position to commence fighting again. Militarily, Japan was no longer a threat and to prevent it from rising again to threaten the Pacific was going to require a political, not a military, solution.

As well, within seven months of the New Zealand forces arriving in Japan, the existence of the BCOF came under threat. The United Kingdom was struggling to maintain adequate forces world-wide due to lack of manpower in the army. The Viscount Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs wrote to Fraser on the 11 November 1946 stating that:

> The salient feature of our army manpower position is that, since we fixed our rate of demobilisation, new military commitments have arisen, and certain other commitments which foreseen...have not been reduced at the rate which we previously expected. As a result there will be 752,000 trained men and women in the army on 31 December 1946, against the military requirements for 821,000, leaving a deficit of 69,000.[68]

This confirmed New Zealand's concern the United Kingdom would not be able to participate fully in Pacific affairs due to a lack of resources. New Zealand had decided to take part in the BCOF partly to encourage the United Kingdom to continue to be a regional power. However with the manpower shortage, London had to prioritise its resources and the North Pacific was not important enough

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[66] BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., *telegram: 17 May 1946*, *ibid*. p.392
[67] BUCKLEY, R, *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain and Japan 1945-1952*, Cambridge, 1982 in TROTTER, A., New Zealand and Japan, p.71

when compared to the United Kingdom's other commitments. When this news became public, Fraser made a statement saying New Zealand understood that "the military commitments which the United Kingdom Government discharge in other parts of the world are very heavy."[68]

Despite the United Kingdom's withdrawal, Fraser went on to reiterate why it was important for New Zealand to continue with the BCOF:

> "In joining in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force with the governments of the United Kingdom, India and Australia, New Zealand is attempting to do her share in securing the victory that force of arms won over Japan"[70]

However, in the same statement, Fraser mentioned New Zealand's own manpower problems and suggested that J Force may even be reduced in size to help alleviate this problem:

> "I am fully aware...of the great difficulty that exists at this time in finding the manpower required to meet the urgent needs of industry. But it must be remembered that those now in J Force will return to industry and, in any case, our commitment will in no way be increased. Indeed, it may be necessary to decrease it."[71]

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[68] ADDISON to FRASER, P. *telegram: 11 November 1946,* in KAY(ed.) volume two, pp.1428-1429

[69] FRASER, P. *Statement 7 February 1947,* in KAY(ed.).volume two. p.1436

[70] *ibid.* p.1436

[71] *ibid.* p.1436

The manpower shortage in New Zealand was serious. The National Employment Department said for 23,500 vacancies in industry there were only 140 semi-employable applications! Pressure was starting to be exerted on the Government to withdraw the New Zealand contingent of the BCOF to help this problem. The *Dominion* on 7 December (to which Fraser was replying in the above statement) quoted the manager of the Metal Trade Employers of Wellington, L R James that:

> "Industry...was of the opinion that the constitution of the J-Force was a mistake in the first place because it so seriously affected the training of apprentices.[72]

And that:

> "Reports from overseas indicate that the British Occupation Force is now being withdrawn and we can therefore reasonably question the necessity for the New Zealand force"[73]

There was to be further pressure on New Zealand's continued involvement in March 1947 when the newly independent Indian Government advised it wanted its contingent to be returned home by the end of the year. This effectively reduced the British Commonwealth Occupation Force to an Australian dominated ANZAC force with some British naval and air assets (and a small army contingent). Any idea that New Zealand was contributing to a joint

[72] JAMES, L., *statement: 7 February 1947*, *ibid.* p.1437
[73] *ibid.* p.1437

Commonwealth effort was shown to be marginalised after only one year of the deployment.

The other main reason for New Zealand's involvement, that of contributing forces to gain influence at the negotiating table, was also under threat. Brigadier Stuart, the first commander of 2NZEF (Japan) stated to the Army Secretary as early as 20 August 1946 (six months after the New Zealand arrival), "My impression was that the Americans were not helpful, and in fact sometimes placed obstacles in our way".[74]

Further, and as has already been indicated, the United States did not take the FEC at all seriously with Berendsen saying the attitude of the United States was causing the FEC to be "nothing but a joke.[75]

The United States regarded the occupation and rebuilding of Japan as an American affair and to a large degree made any effort by New Zealand and the other Commonwealth countries rather irrelevant as noted by Berendsen, writing to Fraser on 31 May:

> All my previous comments on the increasing futile efforts of the Commission to carry out its terms of reference remain valid. Over the whole work of the Commission hangs the shadow of the veto of the United States – more impenetrable because it seems most difficult to ascertain exactly what the United States policy is on a particular matter...Then...if the United States policy has been declared on a

[74] STEWART, K., to CONWAY, A., *Report on the BCOF, ibid.* p.1412
[75] BERENDSEN, C., *Memoirs, Book 3, 1944-1952, unpublished, 4 June 1946*, in TROTTER, A., New Zealand and Japan, p.39

> matter...and the Commission wishes to change it, the process of changing the United States policy in respect to Japan seems to involve clearances through so many different agencies that the expected result is infrequently achieved.[76]

He continued that:

> But even more important and more frustrating is the general attitude of the United States representatives on the Commission from the Chairman down. Acting quite probably on instructions, they definitely assume in all cases a role that might be described as that of a "MacArthur Protection League." There is resistance either explicit or implicit, to any proposed course of action which would involve the slightest deviation from the line that has been adopted by the Supreme Commander[77]

Alister McIntosh, the New Zealand Secretary of External affairs wrote back to Berendsen on the 25 July agreeing with the Washington Minister's views on the FEC:

> Unfortunately, the facts seem to support your judgement that the United States is not genuinely interested in making the Commission an effective body, as was, perhaps, indicated from the first by the calibre of the delegates which she chose to represent her.[78]

New Zealand was in the same situation it had found itself earlier. That is, having to (grudgingly) accept what the United States did simply because as a small country it could do nothing about it.

[76] BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P. *Report:31 May 1946*, in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.453
[77] *ibid*. p.410

As the time passed reasons for a continued New Zealand presence in Japan became more and more difficult to find. The British (and less so the Indian) withdrawal had put to an end to the New Zealand attempt to use the BCOF as a way of keeping Pacific security to the forefront of United Kingdom thinking. Equally, the United States attitude towards the FEC and other countries involved in the Japanese occupation offered no support for a continuing British or even New Zealand presence.

The justification for New Zealand's' involvement in the BCOF came under increasing pressure. Fraser wrote to Joseph Chifley, the Australian Prime Minister on 22 February 1947:

> Notwithstanding this, and the serious doubt we feel as to the value of continued British participation in the military occupation of Japan, we are anxious to do what we can, with our Commonwealth partners, in contributing to the security of the Pacific. We would however suggest that the whole position be reviewed. It seems to us that purely military tasks must be reducing, so permitting some overall reduction in the size of the force to be maintained.
>
> Furthermore, the existence of the force does not afford to any of the participating governments any share in the military government of Japan and an opportunity, therefore, of influencing directly the development of democratic institutions and a way of life in Japan which will not be a menace to the future security of the Pacific. It is doubtful, also, whether the existence of the force is of any value to us in the advocacy generally of policies affecting Japan, while its maintenance in

[78] MACINTOSH, A., to BERENDSEN, C. *telegram: 25 July 1945*, *ibid.* p.453

> a position of substantial inferiority to the Americans tends to diminish our prestige in the eyes of the Japanese.[79]

The New Zealand Government was quickly coming to the view there was little to be gained through a continued role in the BCOF. The reasons for the initial deployment were no longer present, the benefits of the deployment were minimal and the manpower shortage back in New Zealand was serious.

This view was not unanimous though. The New Zealand's Minister in Washington, despite his frustrations with the American attitude felt that if New Zealand was to pull its forces out, it would lose any chance of making a contribution to the peace settlement. He wrote on the 25 February 1947 to Fraser that:

> We have from time to time supported the view that a lengthy occupation is obviously necessary if we are to ensure a peaceful Japan and we cannot with propriety suggest lengthy occupation, or indeed support it, if we are not prepared to take on our proportional part.
>
> Withdraw in whole or in part of New Zealand's forces in Japan might well have a proportionally detrimental effect on the chances of being accorded a proper voice and vote on the peace treaty.[80]

New Zealand decided at this time to reduce the size of its contribution to two thousand four hundred men, down from the original four thousand two hundred and thirty nine. The United States did not question the reduction in forces and

[79] FRASER, p. to CHIFELY, J., *telegram: 22 February 1947*, *ibid*. p.1439

only asked that the publicity on the reductions be made public by SCAP. The lack of concern by the United States with the New Zealand action lends weight to the idea that New Zealand simply did not come into their considerations.

If the New Zealand was making a meaningful contribution to the occupation and its participation was of value to the United States, it would be reasonable to assume the United States would have suggested that New Zealand stay and not have accepted the withdrawal without question. The reality of the situation was, at this stage, the United States was not concerned about New Zealand participation, otherwise they would have encouraged New Zealand to continue to be part of the occupation. Clearly what New Zealand did, or did not do, was not particularly important to the United States.

At the end of September 1947, four months after the New Zealand force reduction, the United Kingdom announced it would be withdrawing the last of its forces from Japan. This provided New Zealand with the opportunity to withdraw fully as well. If the United Kingdom could pull out due to manpower problems, as well as out of frustration at not being able to influence United States attitude, New Zealand surely could withdraw under the same circumstances. Any decision to stay could only have been as a part of an Australian force with little prospect in achieving the earlier laudable goals.

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[80] BERENDSEN, C., to FRASER, P., *telegram: 25 February, ibid.* pp.1440-1441

While attending a Cabinet meeting in Wellington on the 7 February 1948, Fraser discussed the possibility of withdrawing the remainder of the New Zealand forces with the Commander of the BCOF, Lieutenant General Robertson. It was also pointed out by the New Zealand military that the New Zealand presence could not be reduced in size again as one battalion and one squadron, (which had been suggested by the Australians) would be too small to be viable.

The withdrawal of the New Zealand forces continued and on 5 March 1948 Wellington asked Australia to notify the United States that New Zealand would be withdrawing the remainder of its forces from Japan. Again, there was no protest by the United States at the New Zealand decision. The last of the New Zealand forces returned home the end of 1948, bringing to an end New Zealand's first post war deployment

Conclusion

The defeat and surrender of Japan shows the dilemma of small states in international relations. That is their degree of participation and influence is dependent upon the will of larger states. New Zealand had declared war upon and had participated in the defeat of Japan, yet this granted neither status at the signing of the surrender document nor a place at the settlement table negotiating

the final settlement. It was the United States who determined the role New Zealand could play.

As a small state, New Zealand was in no position to dictate to the United States. The situation was exaggerated by the dominance of the United States in the post war period which ensured it could do pretty much what it wanted. With the Soviet Union not yet a superpower, and the United Nations not yet an effective body, the United States did not necessarily have to take other nations into consideration.

Wellington had attempted to influence Washington by actively participating in the occupation of Japan and by indirectly by appealing to the United Kingdom to act on its behalf. However, neither of these approaches worked to any great extent. All that was obtained, after much consternation, was a concession to sign the surrender document and have a limited say in the final negotiations, (which the United States ignored anyway). New Zealand hoped by being part of the BCOF it might have a say in the treaty, but this did not help at all. Berendsen's frustrations with the United States attitude towards the FEC illustrated this point very clearly. New Zealand's military contribution meant very little, if anything, to the United States and hence gained very little political 'clout' to further New Zealand's goals.

New Zealand saw itself as an independent country and was clearly acting as such when it decided to send forces to participate in the occupation of Japan at the end of the war. Peter Fraser continued on the path set out by Savage and the Labour Government of looking after New Zealand's interests before those of others, namely the United Kingdom. New Zealand believed if it contributed to what became known as the BCOF it would benefit from this contribution. These benefits were to be a continued British and Commonwealth military presence in the Pacific and to have a say in the final peace settlement with Japan. There was also the desire for New Zealand to be seen as a 'good citizen' in the international sphere. If New Zealand wanted to be treated as an independent nation by others, it had to act like one.[81]

However rather than simply following the United Kingdom because it was part of a 'greater Britain,' New Zealand aligned itself with the United Kingdom because it was believed that it would be of greatest benefit to New Zealand.

Despite the hopes that went with New Zealand into the deployment, the BCOF was singularly unsuccessful. While it was certainly not a disaster, as New Zealand did not suffer any adverse consequences other than a slightly worsening of the manpower situation at home, in terms of achieving diplomatic goals it produced little result.

[81] FRASER, P., *statement: 7 February 1947*, *ibid* p.1436

The primary expectation of keeping the United Kingdom involved in Pacific security did not happen. After only seven months of being in theatre, the United Kingdom withdrew the majority of its ground forces, and within a year had decided to pull out its remaining naval and air forces.

New Zealand was aware that the United Kingdom would have problems maintaining its worldwide commitments in the post-war world, but hoped to use the BCOF as a way of keeping them in the Pacific. These commitments proved too much for the United Kingdom and they determined the costs of continued involvement were not worth the benefits to them.

The hope of New Zealand contributing to Commonwealth unity never materialised. Only four members contributed forces and two of those, the United Kingdom and India, decided to withdraw some, if not all of their forces within the first year of operations. If anything it showed the concept of Imperial or Commonwealth security was not a viable option. New Zealand continued to hold to the notion of a Commonwealth based system, but only one other independent commonwealth country, Australia, was interested in such a scheme. The United Kingdom was not powerful enough to meet its commitments elsewhere and maintain a credible presence in the Pacific.

The New Zealand actions clearly followed Vital's 'active' policy framework in that New Zealand attempted to influence the external environment to its

advantage. By being part of the BCOF, New Zealand hoped to persuade both the United Kingdom to remain a Pacific power and the United States to include it in the formulation of the Japan settlement. In both cases however, New Zealand's policy did not work.

Notwithstanding, New Zealand clearly did not simply accept that it was too small to contribute in a meaningful manner, either militarily or diplomatically. In the end its size counted against it, but it was certainly not prepared to lie down and do nothing. The result may have been the same, but this does not mean that New Zealand followed Vital's 'passive' policy of doing nothing. New Zealand did try to influence the United Kingdom and the United States. It just did not work

If New Zealand had simply accepted the United States attitude towards the surrender and occupation of Japan it would have followed the 'passive' policy framework: it did not. It did not accept either explicitly or implicitly that it was other than an independent entity. Thus it could not be classified as taking a 'passive' approach.

In terms of the hypothesises, numbers one and two were shown to be valid, however the third was not in this case study.

H1 That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when deciding its external affairs policy.

The fact that both the United Kingdom and the United States advised New Zealand to keep the 2nd NZ Division in the Middle East is not evidence the actual decision to do so was not made in Wellington. Indeed, if New Zealand had wanted to move the force to the Pacific, (as did Australia) there in no suggestion they would have been prevented from doing so. In simple terms, New Zealand's interests agreed with the advice given by its larger allies.

Again, despite being asked by the United Kingdom to be part of a British Commonwealth force in Japan, New Zealand made the decision on its own in pursuit of its own interests. New Zealand had independently declared war upon Japan and had contributed forces to the Pacific war without those of Britain. The decision to send forces was made by a government, under Peter Fraser, who considered themselves to be representatives of an increasingly independent country. They made their decisions accordingly.

H2 New Zealand acted in a way to first benefit New Zealand and not another country.

The decision of Wellington to enter the war with Japan and not to re-deploy the New Zealand forces to the Pacific theatre was made with New Zealand interests to the fore. The Japanese advance was obviously of concern to New Zealand, but it was realised that returning the 2nd NZ Division from the Middle East was not

in the best interests of either New Zealand, the United Kingdom or the United States. The logistics of relocating the division would have placed a strain on the allied war effort and this could only have benefited the enemy they were trying to defeat.

It was its own post war security concerns that led to New Zealand's decision to participate in the BCOF and not concerns for the United Kingdom. The deployment actually revealed a policy difference between New Zealand and the United Kingdom; New Zealand placed greater importance on the operation and the goals it hoped to achieve than the United Kingdom, which started withdrawing only seven months into the deployment.

This difference between the two countries regarding the deployment reinforces the hypothesis that New Zealand's decision for deploying were its own. If New Zealand was simply acting on behalf of the United Kingdom, it would logically have had the same level of enthusiasm for continuing the deployment as the United Kingdom. This was not the case however as shown by Fraser's statement after the United Kingdom announced its withdrawal that it was still important for New Zealand to continue its presence in Japan.[82]

H3 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relations goals.

New Zealand's goal of witnessing the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific was reached, though this obviously was a result of the United States military involvement in this theatre. Nonetheless to the extent possible New Zealand played its part.

In terms of the BCOF, New Zealand did not achieve its goal of keeping the Pacific to the forefront of United Kingdom thinking. If anything can be taken from the surrender and occupation of Japan, it was the continuing maturity of New Zealand's foreign policy. The BCOF was a failure for New Zealand, but it was 'New Zealand's failure.'

The decision to send forces was made in Wellington in anticipation of benefits for New Zealand. In the end these did not materialise, but this was not to be known at the time. What can be concluded however is that in the post war world New Zealand was prepared to accept its responsibilities as an independent nation.

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[82] *ibid.*

Chapter Three:

The Formulation of the ANZUS Pact

This chapter will examine the events leading to the signing of The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) on 1 September 1951. New Zealand's experience in obtaining a security guarantee (in the form of the ANZUS Pact) is an example of a small state successfully achieving external affairs objectives with a much larger and powerful nation, (in this case the United States).

The ANZUS Pact was a further development of an independent New Zealand external affairs policy. For the first time in its history, New Zealand undertook a security arrangement that did not contain the United Kingdom and which did contain a non-Commonwealth member – the United States of America.

The first part of this chapter will briefly look at the newly elected National Government with emphasis on the attitudes of the Prime Minister Sydney Holland, and the External Affairs Minister Frederick Doidge, towards relations with the United Kingdom.

Given the events of the time, it is important to also look at the Korean War. This was the first major external relations crisis which faced the new government.

It is also important as the war was the catalyst, though not the cause, of the formation of the ANZUS Pact. For this reason, New Zealand's involvement in the Korean War will comprise the second part of this chapter. The third and major part of this chapter will review the formation of a Pacific Pact and later the ANZUS Pact.

The National Party in coming to power in 1950 decided an American security guarantee for New Zealand was vital for the future security of the country. This will also be examined in the third part of this chapter, as well an examination why an American security undertaking was important to both New Zealand and Australia (which shared similar views) and how this desire to obtain a security guarantee led to the ANZUS pact. The attitude of the United Kingdom will also be examined in this part of the chapter and the New Zealand reaction it.

The main theme of this chapter is that New Zealand, despite opposition by the United Kingdom, was prepared to follow a policy it believed to be in its interests by persuading the United States to agree to New Zealand's views. This chapter will also reveal that a radical change occurred in external relations decision making. New Zealand (under Holland) was unwilling to make a decision concerning military forces to Korea without checking with the United Kingdom, but was prepared to actively pursue the ANZUS Pact in isolation despite knowing that the United Kingdom had serious concerns about it.

The New National Government

The 1949 general election saw a change in New Zealand's government with the National Party under the leadership of Sydney Holland coming into power. The previous Labour Government first under Savage and later Fraser, had moved New Zealand away from the United Kingdom towards a more independent external affairs outlook. This approach had been heavily criticised by the National Party while in opposition for its supposed 'disloyalty' to the 'Mother-Country.'[83] The National Party was fiercely 'pro-British', so much so that M McKinnon wrote in *Independence and Foreign Policy* that:

> Holland took up Savage's phrase, 'where Britain goes we go,' to the extent that it completely lost its original context and became a partisan motto for the foreign policy of his government.[84]

The principles of the new Prime Minister, Holland, were simple according to David McIntyre; " loyalty to the Empire and free enterprise."[85] The 'Dear old Empire' was very close his heart and he proudly described himself as a "Britisher through and through."[86] Holland also did not have a great interest in external

[83] MCKINNON, M. Independence and Foreign Policy, p.114
[84] *ibid*. p.113
[85] MCINTRYE, W., Background to the ANZUS Pact, Canterbury University Press, Christchurch. 1995. p.6
[86] *ibid*. p.6

affairs, preferring instead the finance portfolio. This was reflected in the choice of the responsibilities he took upon himself.

The incoming government failed to impress the fledgling external affairs department and this caused problems for Alister McIntosh, Head of both the Prime Minister's Department and External Affairs. Because of Holland's disinterest and general attitude toward the issues arising in New Zealand's external affairs, McIntosh did not have a sound relationship with the new Prime Minister. He wrote to Berendsen in Washington on March 6 1950:

> One of the great difficulties about Mr Holland is that he is seeing far too many people other than the officials in his office. He likes to have his evenings to himself, and his weekends, and he just can't read papers or at any rate he won't. He insists that matters be put to him with the conventional ministerial page of foolscap but, actually, he likes it best to have his problems served up to him on a slip of paper that a boy could read on his bike. As you will readily admit, there are very few problems that can be dealt with in such summary form and with the brief and diffused attention for which a boy's bike note is normally drafted.[87]

McIntosh reacted by concentrating on external affairs and directed his deputy, Foss Shanahan, to run the Prime Ministers department. However, the Minister for External Affairs, Frederick Doidge, aggravated McIntosh even more! As he wrote to Berendsen in another letter on 1 February 1950:

[87] MCINTOSH, A, to BERENDSEN, C. *letter: 6 March 1950*, in MCGIBBON, I.(ed.) Undiplomatic Dialouge. p.216

> He is 65, inordinately vain, still a journalist rather than a Minister; he shows no desire to discuss matters and, unless he manages to develop an interest of his own, he just won't concentrate on mastering any topic. It is very difficult to get him to grasp a new idea and even more difficult to steer him off one of his own[88]

As well as failing to impress the Secretary for External affairs, Doidge did not have much standing in Cabinet[89] He was as fiercely 'pro-British" as Holland. George Perkins[90] wrote to Dean Acheson:[91]

> Mr Doidge has been described as being more English than an Englishman. He is extremely Empire-conscious and to him loyalty to the crown is almost a religion.[92]

Holland and Doidge, two men with very little experience (and in the case of Holland little interest) and attitudes more in line with New Zealand circa 1920 were to be two of the key participants in the up coming Korean War which would start less than a year after their election victory.

New Zealand had changed from a political leadership (Fraser and the Labour party) which had a keen interest in external affairs and a desire to pursue a 'New Zealand voice' to one that, at the beginning of its term at least, desired only to follow the United Kingdom. This had the potential to alter radically the direction

[88] MCINTOSH, A., to BERENDSEN, C. *letter: 1 February 1950, ibid.* p.203
[89] MCGIBBON, I., New Zealand and the Korean War: volume one: Politics & Diplomacy (hereafter NZKW: volume one), Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992. p.98
[90] United States Assistant Secretary of State
[91] United States Secretary of State
[92] MCGIBBON, I. NZKW: volume one, p.383

New Zealand was heading. The first test of this was to arise quickly with the Korean crisis.

The Korean War

In 1894 both Japan and China invaded Korea in support of opposing sides after an outbreak of hostilities on the peninsular. The Japanese who had for centuries seen Korea as strategically vital (as it provided an important route to invade mainland China) defeated the Chinese and began an unwelcome occupation. Over the next ten years Japan exercised total control over Korea and in 1905 it became a Japanese protectorate.

Understandably, the Koreans did not accept this. However, the Japanese mercilessly crushed any form of resistance. During the Second World War, of the resistance groups, the communists (despite the fact that they were divided into two rival and often combative camps, - Russian and Chinese) were the most effective. Some Koreans fought the Japanese along side the Chinese communists in China, one of these being Kim Sung-ju, later known as Kim Il-sung.

Korea was a Japanese colony until 1942 when it became part of Japan. However, it was the intention of the United States that a united and independent Korea would emerge from the defeat of Japan. At the end of 1943, along with Chiang Kai-shek and Churchill, Roosevelt said:

> The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.[93]

Following the defeat of Japan, the Korean peninsula was 'liberated' by the allies. The Soviet Union, which had only just declared war on Japan, accepted the surrender in the North of the country whereas the United States did the same in the South[94]. Control of the country was now split along the 38th Parallel with the North coming under the 'influence' of the Soviet Union and the people to the South the United States.

The United States desire for an independent Korea was not be realised. With the Cold War just beginning neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared to relinquish dominance over the other part of Korea. A communist government was formed in Pyongyang and a right wing military government in the South.

[93] ROOSEVELT, CHIANG KAI-SHEK & CHURCHILL, *The Cairo Declaration: 1 December 1943*, in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.3

[94] The US did not actually arrive in Korea until 8 September, a month after the USSR.

Both governments and their backers wanted unification, but as both regarded the other as illegitimate, it had to be on their terms. Elections[95] were held in the South on May 10 1948 and on August 15 1948 the newly elected President Rhee declared the independent state of the Republic of Korea. One month later, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was declared in the North under the leadership of Premier Kim Il-sung.

The United Nations and western countries recognised the southern government while the communist countries recognised the north. The Koreans may have had their 'independence,' but at the price of the country being split in half with two diametrically opposed governments. The governments in Seoul and Pyongyang each considered themselves as the only legitimate rulers of the whole country and border clashes, started in 1948 and continued through into 1950 as the relationship between the two deteriorated even further.

On 25 June 1950 North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea starting the Korean War. In New York a meeting of the United Nations Security Council was quickly called the same day and a resolution condemning North Korea's action was passed. The motion also called for the member states to make contributions in support of the resolution. The Soviet Union did not attend the meeting however and declared any action made by the United Nations void.

[95] The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea supervised the elections. New Zealand was not part of UNTCOK

The United States considered the invasion as evidence of the expansionist nature of communism and believed the Kremlin was behind such a policy. As noted by McGibbon in *New Zealand & The Korean War*:

> The North Korean attack had not only occurred at a time when the climate of opinion in Washington was conducive to a firm stand against communist encroachment but also appeared to validate assumptions about United States security which had been included in the just-completed major review of policy. The resulting document, NSC68 stressed the urgency of meeting the Soviet challenge, which was expected to become more aggressive...Since the struggle had become worldwide, the 'defeat of free institutions anywhere' would be 'a defeat anywhere.'[96]

In New Zealand the Secretary of External Affairs, McIntosh, briefed the Government on 29 June 1950 on what he saw as New Zealand's obligations to South Korea in light of the United Nations Charter:

> New Zealand is not under any specific obligation to supply any armed forces. However, the Charter prescribes that the United Nations Security Council "may take action by air, sea or land forces." Under Article 43 of the Charter, all members were expected to conclude agreements with the United Nations as to the extent of such contributions they would be prepared to pledge. These agreements have not been concluded.
>
> Nevertheless, it could be argued that other Articles of the Charter, e.g. 42, 48 and 49, taken together impose a general obligation to co-operate in carrying out measures which the Security Council may decide. It is

[96] MCGIBBON, I., NZKW: volume one, p.96

> more a political than a legal question. The United States having taken the lead, and Britain followed, other members of the Commonwealth, and particularly New Zealand and Australia, have to decide whether they will also contribute practical support now or later.[97]

Later the same day Prime Minister Holland made a statement to the House on the situation in Korea. The statement fully agreed with McIntosh's view given earlier in the day. He stated that the New Zealand Government backed the action taken by the United Nations Security Council and:

> Despite the fact that the arrangements contemplated in Article 43 of the Charter have not been concluded, because of disagreements between the leading members, and there are no formal agreements with the Security Council under which members would make available to the Council armed forces and other assistance which the Council could call upon and use where necessary, the New Zealand Government hold the view that the Security Council has a clear duty to maintain international peace and security, and they feel that it is incumbent upon members of the United Nations to give their full co-operation in all endeavours to achieve that end.[98]

However, this convergence of views between the Prime Minister and his External Affairs Secretary is misleading. Writing to Berendsen on the 4 July, Macintosh said that:

> The Korean business has indeed been very odd from our point of view. Mr Holland was not at all anxious to take any part and the statement

[97] PM 324/2/3 pt1, *Briefing by McIntosh to Cabinet: 29 June 1950*
[98] NZPD: *29 June 1950*

> that he made was decided upon during the lunch hour, to enable him to make it in the House.[99]

Indeed, Holland was more interested in the British response than any advice given by his own officials.[100] This singularly failed to impress Macintosh at the time. However, this is very harsh for in reality there were very few options available to Holland at this early stage.

In terms of a military response, Truman's initial reaction was to support South Korea with air and sea power. This was supported by the United Kingdom which decided to dispatch naval forces to the region. As New Zealand was not in a position to offer any aircraft any military response would have to take the form of a naval contribution. With the extremely close ties between the RN and the RNZN any New Zealand response would be co-ordinated with London.

Holland had been in power for less than a year and was still naive in the external realm. It is understandable therefore that he would want to follow the United Kingdom's lead rather than 'beat his own path.' It is doubtful whether New Zealand would have reacted differently under any other administration, as at this early stage there were very few options other than condemnation of the attack, consultation with the United States, the United Kingdom, other members of the Commonwealth and the offer of naval forces.

[99] MCINTOSH, A. to BERENDSEN, C. *letter: 4 July 1950*, in MCGIBBON, I. (ed.) Undiplomatic

The same day Holland made his statement to the House (29 June), the frigates HMNZS *Pukaki* and HMNZS *Tutira* (the only New Zealand ships available) were made available to the RN Far Eastern Fleet for operations in Korea.

By publicly stating New Zealand's outrage at the North Korean attack and his government's support for the actions of the United Nations, the United States and the United Kingdom, he declared New Zealand's position.

Berendsen writing to McIntosh later the same month noted that Holland's statements had gone down well in Washington.[101] Berendsen viewed the Korean War and the reaction by the United Nations and the Western governments as crucial for the future of both the United Nations and the world as a whole. He wrote to Doidge on 4 July 1950 about the outbreak of fighting on the Korean Peninsula, ending with a passionate plea on the importance of the United Nations responding to the North Korean invasion:

> If fate allows, and we chose to make it so, this could, indeed be a turning point in the history of the world. By this decision and by this action we could "this day light a candle, by God's Grace, as shall never be put out"-a beacon that for generations and centuries to come may guide the faltering footsteps of men of Goodwill in their search for world peace. I can see the possibility, and I rejoice to see it, that if we guide and comport ourselves aright, with wisdom and with resolution, we may indeed be on our way to solve the greatest political problem of our age.

Dialouge, p.233
[100] MCGIBBON, I. NZKW: volume one, p.80
[101] BERENDSEN, C. to MCINTOSH, A. MCGIBBON, I. Undiplomatic Dialouge, p.234

> Time and the event will show –but, here and now, a great opportunity does present itself.[102]

Despite the rapid response by the United Nations, and particularly the United States, the situation in Korea quickly deteriorated. It became clear that to stop the North Korean advance the member states of the United Nations would need to provide more than sea and air power: ground forces were to be needed.

Two weeks after Holland announced to the House that New Zealand was sending HMNZS *Pukaki* and HMNZS *Tutira* a request from the United Nations Secretary General for more military forces, particularly ground troops, was received in Wellington.

New Zealand's defence priority was, however, at this time focused on providing forces for the Middle East - in case a 'third world war' broke out. There were no ground units available to the government for a deployment to Korea as all were earmarked for a possible, rapid deployment to Middle East.

However the General Staff advised, that it would be possible to specially raise a unit of about one thousand men to fight in Korea without causing too much disruption to the Middle East commitment.[103] Yet, as with the initial naval deployment, Holland was not keen on a deployment and sought the views of Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada on their policy towards ground forces.

[102] PM 324/2/3 BERENDSEN,C. to DOIDGE,F. *memorandum: 4 July 1950*

None of the other Commonwealth could at this stage, foresee themselves providing a ground contribution.

However, discussions with Australia and the United Kingdom about what form any possible deployment would take continued over the next ten days. If New Zealand was to send forces it had been suggested these could be part of a 'Commonwealth Division' containing combat forces from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The idea of such a force had been around at least since July 3 when the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff recommended that any force sent to Korea should be a Commonwealth rather than purely British force.[104]

A Commonwealth force suited New Zealand as it could support both the United Nations and the United States within an organisation (i.e. the Commonwealth) that it was familiar[105] with. This was because the Commonwealth militaries were very much alike in structure, equipment and training.

Accordingly, New Zealand decided that if there was to be a ground contribution, it would be in the form of artillery. It was believed that artillery would be less likely to sustain heavy losses and would provide the least amount of disruption to the Middle East commitment. The Australians, however, pressured

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[103] MCGIBBON, I. NZKW: volume one p.92
[104] SCHNABEL & WATSON, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the Joint Chiefs od Staff and National Policy, volume three*, Michael Glazier, Wilmington, 1979, p.150 in MACINTRYRE, W. Background to the ANZUS Pact, p274

New Zealand to provide an infantry battalion to be part of an Anzac Brigade. Macintosh wrote to Berendsen that:

> ...the Australians are doing their best to build up an Anzac Brigade to which we [would be according to the Australian plan]... contributing a battalion of infantry. That is the very thing that we don't want to do. We can supply Artillery. We would feel safer in having this particular type of unit and my own views is that we should stick to it.[106]

He also noted the Prime Minister's performance in dealing with the Australians on this matter:

> There is no doubt that Fadden, perhaps on Menzies' instructions, tried to bustle Mr Holland, and I give our man full marks for the way he handled the matter[107]

However the situation moved forward rapidly. On 25 July 1950 the United Kingdom announced suddenly to New Zealand they would be sending a ground contingent to Korea.

This was a major shock to both New Zealand and Australia as they had no forewarning of the British decision. The United Kingdom had also advised them not to send forces as it would disrupt Middle East commitments.[108] The British

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[105] MCGIBBON, I., NZKW, volume one, p.288
[106] MCINTOSH, A. to BERENDSEN, C. *letter: 16 July 1950* in MCGIBBON, I. (ed.) Undiplomatic Dialouge, p.238
[107] *ibid.* p.238
[108] MCINTYRE, W. Background to the ANZUS Pact, p.275

announcement was due to fears of possible adverse effects on the United Kingdom/United States relationship had they continued to hold out.

Holland and the government had come to the conclusion that if New Zealand was to contribute land forces it would be preferable for there to be a co-ordinated response from the Commonwealth.[109] As soon as the United Kingdom had made it known they were to commit troops New Zealand needed to make a very quick decision on whether to follow lest they be seen to be 'out of step' with the United Kingdom.

On 26 July at 1930 hrs, (only a few hours after the cable from Britain) Holland informed the House New Zealand would be sending an artillery unit to Korea. The timing pre-empted both the UK and Australia, who made similar announcements over the next few hours. The result was that a false impression of Commonwealth unity among the Commonwealth countries existed, when in reality there had been little.

Holland had simply followed the United Kingdom in this case. There is no reason to believe he would have sent ground troops without it being part of a Commonwealth effort. As with the decision to send the frigates, the government did in the end pursue a policy in line with the advice of its senior advisors (i.e. McIntosh and Berendsen), but the decision had more to do with the actions of the United Kingdom rather than the argument of the New Zealand officials.

The New Zealand contingent was to be known as Kayforce, the main body of which reached Korea on the 10 December 1950. On the evening of 24 January, in response to an Australian request, the New Zealand gunners saw action for the first time. Over the next two and a half years the New Zealander's distinguished themselves as an outstanding artillery unit of the war.[110] The fighting continued until 28 July 1953 when the cease-fire came into effect[111]. Thirty-three New Zealanders died on active service in Korea with another eighty one wounded. New Zealand forces stayed in the region for a further four years monitoring the Armistice with the last New Zealand military personnel returning home in 1957.

The reasons for New Zealand's involvement had largely been vindicated. New Zealand had followed Britain into Korea with the initial decision to send the two frigates, followed by the ground force, both serving within a British Commonwealth environment. Although the formation of the Commonwealth force had not been made with the degree of solidarity Holland had hoped for, when it did come together it worked well

By contributing forces New Zealand had furthered the case of Commonwealth unity and defence. It also succeeded in its external affairs policy of keeping

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[109] MCGIBBON, I. NZKW, volume one, p.284
[110] O'NEILL, R. Australia in the Korean War: 1950-53: volume two: Combat Operations, The Australian Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1985. pp.131-160
[111] The war has never finished. There is just the Armistice agreement keeping the forces apart

closely aligned with Britain while trying to achieve wider goals, (i.e. supporting the United Nations and United States).

New Zealand's support of the United Nations had also been justified. The United Nations and the West had stood up to what it saw as blatant communist aggression by stopping the North Korean invasion, although unification was no closer to fruition under a democratic government.[112] The fighting ended in stalemate after considerable destruction, with neither side gaining an advantage. Nonetheless, South Korea lived on and by being involved New Zealand had helped prevent the United Nations from going the same way as the League of Nations.

There was also another factor, though small, that influenced the New Zealand decision to send ground forces. This was a desire to gain influence with the United States in order to gain a possible security guarantee.

Although not as yet widespread, a growing feeling was forming in New Zealand that an alliance with the United States would be highly beneficial. However, if New Zealand were seen not to back the United Nations and Washington in Korea with ground forces, it would make an alliance with the United States much harder to obtain. As Berendsen noted on July 17, 1950:

[112] O'NEILL, R. Australia in the Korean War 1950: volume one: Strategy and Diplomacy, The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra

> [The Americans were] now regarding this incident as a means of 'separating the sheep from the goats' and of distinguishing those countries who can be relied upon from those who cannot, and they show some signs of regarding this as a test for those who might, at the proper time in future, form the foundation of [a] Pacific pact.[113]

A Pacific Pact

The years after the end of the Second World War saw the beginning of the Cold War. Communism was viewed by the West as an evil force attempting to take over the world. Both Hungary in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948, came under Soviet control and the blockade of Berlin in 1948 was further 'proof' of the communist threat.

As a result, the Atlantic Pact was formulated to meet the perceived Soviet threat in Western Europe. Signed on 4 April 1949 by the nations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, it was a defensive Pact to deter any possible invasion by the Soviet Union.

Peter Fraser submitted the idea of a similar Pacific Pact during his Prime Ministerial visit to Canada on 8 January 1949. However while reflecting on the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty three months later in April he did not see the formation of an Pacific Pact as an urgent priority, but:

[113] MCGIBBON, I. NZKW: volume one, p.91

> If the need arose for the democratic nations of the Pacific to stand together, I am sure we would see a Pacific Pact developing, along the lines of the Atlantic Pact, which is shaping up now.
>
> Such a pact...would obviously [sic] include New Zealand, Australia, Britain, Canada, the United States, Mexico and certain of the Central and South American nations. [114]

The countries named by Fraser above were simply the ones he thought of at the time. He was speaking 'off the cuff' in an interview and was not expressing government policy in any way.

Replying to a question in the House later in the same year he again reiterated the position that if the need arose; a Pacific pact would come into beginning. He also commented that:

> New Zealand's co-operation on defence problems with the United Kingdom and Australia is *an important beginning in promoting security arrangements in the Pacific,* and these will be extended with other democratic countries as circumstances permit. [Emphasis added by author][115]

Clearly New Zealand did not see the need for a regional pact at this stage even if the possibility of a communist invasion was seen as a threat in the foreseeable future. Indeed, it was not the direct threat of a communist invasion which

[114] FRASER, P. *statement: 8 January 1948*, in KAY, R.(ed.) Documents on New Zealand External Relations: volume three: The ANZUS Pact and the Peace Treaty of Japan, (hereafter KAY(ed.) volume three), Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1985. p.478

concerned New Zealand the most. The idea of a rearmed and once again powerful Japan was seen as a major threat to Pacific, and hence New Zealand's, security.[116]

The final Japanese Peace Treaty had not been determined and New Zealand, along with Australia, were anxious to see that any treaty would not allow Japan to rebuild its military power. Unless Japan rearmed or a direct communist threat emerged, New Zealand did not have requirement for a Pacific security arrangement.

New Zealand still saw the United Kingdom rather than the United States as the cornerstone of its Pacific security policy. This, surprisingly, despite the failure of the United Kingdom to stop the Japanese during the Second World War, its inability to even sustain a brigade during the occupation of Japan and the obvious fact that it was literally on the other side of the earth. The United States, upon which any Pacific pact would be based, on the other hand had stopped the Japanese, was clearly the dominant military force in the world and actually bordered the Pacific.

Still the idea of a Pacific Pact was not universally accepted. It was hoped in many corners that the United Nations, unlike its predecessor the League of Nations, would become the forum where international disputes and issues would

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[115] FRASER, P. *statement: 20 July 1949,* NZPD: volume 285, pp.576-7

be resolved. New Zealand in particular had been a strong supporter and advocate of the United Nations both during its formation and its early years. Berendsen reflected the view that the United Nations should be the lead organisation in international affairs and not regional alliances. In a letter to Frederick Doidge on 14 March 1950 he said:

> I do not myself believe in regional arrangements for peace or defence.[117]

Berendsen wanted the United Nations, not regional alliances, to be the foundation for world peace. This was actually counter to the United Nations Charter which saw regional alliances as very important to maintaining international stability. But he also understood the United Nations had quickly become impotent after it had been set up. The United Nations and its authority clearly played 'second fiddle" to the realities of the Cold War. The five permanent members of the Security Council with their power of veto ensured the United Nations was not going to fulfil the role that countries like New Zealand had hoped. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, two ideological opposites and distrusting enemies were always going to struggle to find common ground.

Berendsen realised this fact rather reluctantly and said in the same letter:

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[116] DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, *memorandum on the General Attitude to the*

> But where we cannot achieve a world system of collective security then I am entirely ready to accept a regional system as the best available, and my principal regret in respect of the Atlantic Pact is that it is confined to the Atlantic Powers and to the Atlantic area.[118]

He also pointed out in this letter that it would be the United States New Zealand would have to look to as a security guarantor. The United Kingdom was simply not capable of providing the assurances New Zealand needed. Neither was the United Nations an option due to its inability to function effectively. This left only the United States. Still it would be "unthinkable" that the United Kingdom would not be included in a Pacific Pact, but if for some reason they could not, or would not, be involved Berendsen said this should not stop New Zealand being part of it.[119]

Berendsen was one of the dominant figures in the development of New Zealand's external affairs policy at this time and for him to suggest a path that did not include the United Kingdom was, if not radical, then a significant step in the further development of an independent policy. New Zealand had been making its own decisions with reference to external affairs certainly since 1936, however, decisions were generally made with 'one eye on London.' Here Berendsen suggested that New Zealand may (if the United Kingdom did not become involved) have to go it alone.

Japanese Settlement: 11 August 1947, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.97
[117] BERENDSEN, C. to DOIDGE, F. *dispatch: 14 March 1950*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.527
[118] *ibid*

Just who would be in a Pacific Pact became a major issue whenever the concept was discussed. Fraser mentioned a Pact that contained New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Mexico and some Central and South American countries. Later on, the Asian countries were included in discussions; the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia were variously mentioned. However, to include these countries would have required the establishment of a comprehensive pact covering the whole Asia-Pacific region.

An alternative idea for a limited pact, including only a few nations - New Zealand, Australia, The United States, and the United Kingdom, with possibly Japan, the Philippines and Canada was proposed.

Notwithstanding the issue of membership, consensus was evident on the form of any treaty. It would be similar to the newly formed Atlantic Pact, that is mutually defensive in nature. If one country was to come under attack, the other members of the pact would be obliged to come to the aid of that country.

Incredibly the Chiefs of Staff in New Zealand were still not particularly interested in any alliance which included New Zealand and the United States. Their view was that the role of the New Zealand military was to provide forces for the Middle East 'in the case of a Third World War.' It was here they felt New

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[119] *ibid*

Zealand could make its most significant contribution in the fight against communism. On April 28 1950, they wrote to Macintosh:

> The outstanding feature of the strategic situation in the Pacific is the strength of United States sea power. Unless and until the United States position is successfully challenged neither the Soviet Union nor any Russian satellite can undertake military operations outside the continental limits of Asia. *There is, thus, no direct threat to New Zealand.* [emphasis added by author]
>
> ...The fate of New Zealand will be determined in such a war by the success or failure of allied arms in the vital theatres, i.e., Western Europe and the Middle East. The final decision will not be critically affected by the turn of events in other areas-e.g., South-East Asia.
>
> ...On military grounds there are at present no reasons for an approach by New Zealand to the United States for the conclusion of a Pacific Defence Pact.[120]

As there was no direct threat to this country, and any future Russian or Japanese threat would be dealt with by the United States Navy, New Zealand did not have to worry about the security situation in the Pacific. It could concentrate its defence efforts on preparing to fight in the Middle East and leave its own security in the hands of the United States as it had done in 1942.

The New Zealand military chiefs supported their view by quoting from a British military report, which said:

> Should the defence of South-East Asia be gravely threatened by a Communist rising, it is possible that assistance to the Allied forces in the area might be required. This possibility must not be allowed to affect plans to implement the main requirement of assistance in the Middle East.[121]

The Middle East was clearly seen as New Zealand's vital theatre, it seems at least as much as New Zealand itself! It is important to remember, as was stated earlier in their report, the Chiefs of Staff did not believe New Zealand was threatened. If a war did break out in Asia it was thought it would be contained to the Asian mainland as logistics difficulties (as well as the United States Navy) would prevent any far ranging operations over water.

Still whether they would have supported sending virtually all of the New Zealand Army and the RNZAF to the Middle East if an enemy had risen to sweep all before it in Asia and was bearing down on the South Pacific is debatable. In 1942 the New Zealand forces were already in the Middle East and it would have been logistically difficult to have them return. However, had Japan started its campaign before the New Zealand force left to fight the Germans and Italians it would have been extremely unlikely any New Zealand government would have sent its forces so far from its shores.

Neither was the Department of External Affairs keen on a Pacific Pact. They shared the same views as the Chiefs of Staff about where New Zealand should

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[120] CHIEFS OF STAFF to MCINTOSH, A, *memorandum: 28 April 1950,* in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.536

be concentrating its military focus and held other reservations that a comprehensive Pacific Pact was not in New Zealand's interests. These reasons were given as:[122]

• Though New Zealand, Australia and the United States had a great deal in common this was not the case with their relations with the Asian nations, or between these nations themselves

• New Zealand could not trust the Asian nations. New Zealand and Australia might see the Asian countries strengthened economically and militarily as a result of the Pact and then find these Asian countries 'changing sides' and becoming potential enemies. It was also felt that the Asian nations could not be relied on.

• New Zealand would be over-stretched to meet military commitments to the region and the Middle East.

• Using New Zealand military forces in this region would be a waste of military effort when they would be needed elsewhere.

The idea of fighting on behalf of Asian countries, considered to be unreliable, corrupt and even potential foes was not considered to be of any benefit to New

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[121] *ibid*. p.537

Zealand. It was very doubtful that any Asian country could contribute anything to the defence of New Zealand. They were backward militarily; and if a threat did emerge to New Zealand most would have already come under the influence of the threat and hence not be in a position to help. .

A limited Pact, (which it was envisaged by the United States would include New Zealand, Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Japan and the Philippines) would not be acceptable as this would entail military and political relations with Japan. As noted later in the Report on the Australian-New Zealand consultations with Dulles at Canberra from 15 to 18 February 1951: it would:

> "be highly unacceptable to the New Zealand public. Moreover, it would be difficult to be party to a collective obligation to defend Japan and at the same time secure the primary objective of a guarantee against the possibility of Japanese Aggression.[123]

The External Affairs Department suggested the best option available to New Zealand was to pursue an informal United States security guarantee.[124] It was considered it was inconceivable that the United States would fail to come to the aid of New Zealand and Australia if a threat emerged, particularly if New Zealand was fighting elsewhere.

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[122] DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, *Note on Defence Aspects of the Japanese Peace Settlement: 30 January 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, pp.558-563
[123] DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, *Report on the Australian-New Zealand consultations with Dulles at Canberra 15-18 February 1951,* in KAY(ed.) volume three p.632
[124] DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, *Note on Defence Aspects of the Japanese Peace Settlements: 30 January 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.632

The United Kingdom was not keen on the idea of a Pacific Pact either. When the Australian Minster for External Affairs Percy Spender travelled to the United States on board the *Queen Mary* (leaving Southampton on 7 September 1950) he discussed the idea of a Pacific Pact with the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin who was also travelling. Despite Spender explaining that a pact was very important to Australia (and New Zealand), Bevin said that the United Kingdom did not favour the idea at all saying that it needed to include Asia, which was impossible without India otherwise it would be a 'white mans pact.'[125] As Spender later wrote in *Exercises in Diplomacy*:

> I felt when I left Bevin's stateroom that despite the warm personal hearing he accorded me, I had failed...to penetrate the U.K. indifference, if not opposition, to the idea [of a Pacific Pact].[126]

The ANZUS Pact

In contrast to the rather 'luke-warm' response by the Chiefs of Staff, and his own Ministry, the Minister for External Affairs was enthusiastic about the idea of a Pacific Pact that included the United States. Writing to Berendsen on 9 May 1950 he said:

[125] SPENDER, P. Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1969. pp.35-37
[126] *ibid.* p.37

> .... If there was any possibility of having a limited Pact...I would be happy to consider it, as I regard an American guarantee of our security as the richest prize of New Zealand diplomacy.[127]

Later the same day Doidge released a statement to the press saying that the security of both New Zealand and Australia could not be assured without the establishment of a Pacific Pact along the same lines of the Atlantic Pact. He also stated that such a Pact would have to include not only New Zealand, Australia and the United States but also the United Kingdom, Canada and India for it to be effective.[128] How India was to be a member of a Pacific Pact is not clear and it appears that Doidge's reference to it was more a reflection of his strong feelings toward a united British Commonwealth than any practical rationale.

Doidge was not as confident as his military chiefs on the lack of threat to New Zealand. Earlier in 1949 while in opposition, he told the House that:

> The gravest danger spot in the world to-day is not Germany, not Western Europe, but south-east Asia. ...[A]nd south-east Asia is an area bordered by...Australia and New Zealand in the east.[129]

New Zealand and Australia were very concerned about the possibility of a rearmed Japan. Memories of the earlier threat posed by Japan were still fresh in the minds of most New Zealanders and parallels (somewhat inaccurately) with the resurgence of Germany after the First World War were made. If Germany

[127] DOIDGE, F., to BERENDSEN, C. *letter: 9 May 1950*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.546
[128] *ibid.* p.547
[129] NZPD *30 June 1949*

could rise after being defeated in 1918, Japan could then rise again after the end of Second World War. As such it was necessary to impose a 'hard' final settlement should be forced on Japan. This ignored the fact that it was the very harsh settlement imposed upon Germany after the First World War probably more than any other factor that lead to the rise of the Nazis in Germany. New Zealand and Australia felt Japan should be prevented from having the ability to threaten its neighbours again, for if given the chance again it would surely take it and they felt that a strict post war conditions would prevent this from happening.

The United States however were more concerned over the communist threat in the Asian region. On 30 December 1949 the United States produced NSC 48/2: The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia. It stated that some of the prime United States objectives in the region were:

> *b.* Development of sufficient military power in selected non-Communist nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by communism.
> *c.* Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten peace, a national independence and stability of the Asiatic [sic] nations.[130]

Included in the recommendations set out in NSC48/2 to achieve these goals was:

> Active consideration should be given to means by which all members of the British Commonwealth may be induced to play a more active role in collaboration with the United States in Asia.[131]

This concern about the spread of communism through Asia was reflected in the United States approach to Japan. There was concern that unless a Peace Treaty was put in place, Japan would become vulnerable to Communism. The United States 'Ambassador at Large,' Jessup, wrote to Acheson saying it was important that there should be:

> Rapid steps towards a peace conference [sic], with or without the Soviets, and conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, with or without agreement of all interested powers...[132]

However, there was debate in the United States on what form a Peace Treaty should take. The State Department wanted Japan to become aligned with the West, while the military wanted Japan to become a democratic, neutral and unarmed state. There was, however, concern expressed by both New Zealand and Australia about any possible peace treaty.

New Zealand and Australia could understand the United States' concerns over a possible communist take over of Japan, (either by force or persuasion), however, they remained firm in the belief that future Japanese aggression was

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[130] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Foreign Relations of the United States: volume VII 1949, East Asian-Pacific Area, (hereafter FRUS), Department of State, Washington. 1975. p.1216
[131] *ibid* p.1220

the greatest potential threat to their security. If the United States could provide New Zealand and Australia with a security guarantee they would be prepared to support the peace treaty that could include a provision for the rearming of Japan.

If an American security guarantee was not forthcoming to prevent any future Japanese expansion, neither New Zealand or Australia was prepared to support any conclusion to the peace treaty. The depth of feeling in New Zealand and Australia on the matter is illustrated by David McIntyre in *Background to the ANZUS Pact* when he describes a meeting between Dulles and Spender on 22 September 1950:

> When he spoke with Spender and David McNicol (of the Australian Embassy), Dulles stressed the need to deny Japan's resources to the Soviet Union and at the same time avoid Japanese resentment. Allison [Head of the Northeast Asia Affairs division at the State Department] later wrote a graphic description of Spender's reaction. He thought Spender was 'going to have apoplexy'. 'Sir Percy...is a rather short, reddish-haired man with a florid complexion. As he read [the US] memorandum [on the Japanese Peace Treaty] his face grew more and more suffused with color, and at one point I thought he would burst a blood vessel.' He recalled that Spender 'did not hesitate to express his opinion in colorful and uninhibited language.' The Australian bluntly reminded Dulles of his country's fears of a Japanese resurgence. He said that Australia would not support the peace treaty unless it was assured of its own security.[133]

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[132] *ibid.* p.1213
[133] MCINTYRE, W. Background to the ANZUS Pact, p.285

Other reasons, apart from a concern about Japanese expansion, were also behind the desire for a security guarantee. It was thought an American security guarantee would help the New Zealand commitment to the Middle East rather than hinder it. The spread of communism, while worrying to New Zealand, was at this stage at least, of far less concern than a strong Japan. New Zealand was preparing to face communism, albeit this was to be in the Middle East and not in the Pacific. A security guarantee by the Americans would satisfy both of these concerns.

Apart from protecting New Zealand from Japan, a Pacific Pact would also provide for the security of New Zealand in the unlikely event of a communist threat arising while New Zealand had its military forces in the Middle East. An American guarantee would 'close the back door' so to speak. It would allow New Zealand to concentrate on the Middle East, free from the worry of a direct threat to the New Zealand mainland, as was the case in 1942.

The Australians gave another reason for the tripartite treaty. As they, (and New Zealand) were prepared to make contributions to stopping the world-wide spread of communism they should have a voice in global strategy. As things stood at this time they were underpinning the North Atlantic Treaty by readying forces to fight, but still they had no real voice on international security. A Pacific treaty would provide the forum for Australia and New Zealand to have their voices heard.

The idea of a trilateral agreement was beginning to find support in Washington. On October 9 1950 Dean Rusk[134] wrote to Elbert Mathews[135]:

> There appears to be merit...in tightening our relationships with Australia and New Zealand. The cooperation and support of these countries will be of increasing importance to us during the coming year as we face the peculiarly difficult problems of the post-hostilities security and reconstruction of Korea and the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty. Therefore, if by trilateral agreement, the desires of Australia [and New Zealand] for some closer relationship can be met, it would appear to be likewise in our interest to proceed toward this objective.[136]

The attitude of the United States towards New Zealand at this time was summed up in a United States policy document toward New Zealand released by the State Department on 30 July, 1951. Although this was eight months after Rusk's above statement, it does explain the United States attitude at the time. There was an appreciation that:

> In international affairs New Zealand often follows British or Australian leadership: but it should not be forgotten that New Zealand is an independent country which appreciates being approached directly and that it occasionally resents the aggressive assertion of leadership by Australia.[137]

[134] United States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
[135] United States Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
[136] RUSK, D. to MATHEWS, E. *memorandum: 9 October 1950*, in FRUS: volume VI 1950, East Asian-Pacific Area, Department of State, Washington, 1976. p.146
[137] FRUS: volume VI, pt2: Asia and the Pacific, p.1488

The nature of the United States/New Zealand relationship and the importance of it to the United States was summed up thus:

> Our relations with New Zealand have always been most friendly and there has been very little discord in our relations, either political or economic. To the extent that we continue our present close cooperation with the United Kingdom we can be assured of a generally sympathetic attitude on the part of the New Zealand Government and public opinion. On the other hand New Zealand support for US policies, particularly in the Far East, can be of great value in obtaining support within the Commonwealth for our objectives and policies.
>
> There continues to be some fear in New Zealand that in building up Japan we are paying insufficient attention to the security considerations which are paramount in New Zealand's attitude toward the reconstruction of Japan. These fears would be allayed in large measure by the proposed Pacific security arrangement. New Zealand support for the Japanese peace treaty we believe necessary in the light of present circumstances would also have some bearing on United Kingdom and Australian attitudes toward this question.
>
> New Zealand and the United States share a common western European tradition, the heritage of the English common law and a distaste for arbitrary power and violent change. The national interests of our two countries in safeguarding and preserving the principles of democratic government are fundamentally the same. This means that in any issue involving a matter of principle New Zealand's reactions are apt to parallel those of the US. New Zealand can be of assistance to us in UN affairs and in Far Eastern problems generally.[138]

New Zealand's traditional security partner, the United Kingdom, was also beginning to resist the idea of New Zealand (and Australia) being part of a Pacific Pact which did not include them. They were of the understanding (from

discussions they had had with the United States) that they would only be a 'consultant' and not an active member of any Pacific pact.

This would be an embarrassment to the United Kingdom particularly as they still considered themselves a world power. To be left out of a Pacific pact would imply to the rest of the world they were not. The United Kingdom still had interests in the region (Malaya. Singapore, Hong Kong, Borneo) and to be left out of a Pacific pact would, in the view of the United Kingdom, diminish its standing with these countries. The prospect of New Zealand and Australia, two nations with very close historic and cultural links with the United Kingdom being part of an arrangement without them would further reinforce the feeling of embarrassment.

The United Kingdom's High Commissioner wrote to Shanahan (who was acting head of the External Affairs Department) expressing the views of his government:

> The United Kingdom authorities, ... as present advised, ...would not favour the idea of a Pacific defence organisation which excluded the United Kingdom[139]

The United Kingdom's attitude towards a Pacific Pact, particularly one that did not include them, was beginning to annoy the Australian government. The New Zealand High Commission in Canberra wrote to Shanahan on February 5 1951

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[138] *ibid.* P.1489
[139] PRICE, C. to DOIDGE, F. *telegram: 2 February 1951,* in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.570

advising that Australia felt the United Kingdom would complicate matters and make it harder for Australian and New Zealand to achieve a desirable outcome with the United States. New Zealand replied the next day that they felt (at this stage) the United Kingdom involvement was welcome and was not causing any problems. The United Kingdom was seen as having considerable experience in these types of matters and their advice would be useful.

However, when the United Kingdom informed Doidge of its views, Prime Minister Holland was in Washington for talks with the United States leadership. It was during a meeting on 8 February that Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested a tripartite security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

Holland informed the Americans of New Zealand's reasons for seeking a security guarantee, as he recalled in a letter to Doidge after the meeting:

> I made the point that we in New Zealand sought an American guarantee of security for two reasons: first, because our people fear the resurgence of Japanese militarism. They would not willingly accept a peace treaty with Japan which contained no safeguards against Japanese rearmament....The second reason was that we wished to fulfil our obligations to send troops and airforces to the Middle East as part of our contribution in the event of war.[140]

[140] HOLLAND, S. to DOIDGE, F. *telegram: 8 February 1951*, in KAY (ed.) volume three, p.583

At the end of the meeting the idea of a pact containing New Zealand, Australia and the United States was proposed by the United States, as Holland told Doidge:

> Toward the end of the discussion he [Rusk] himself volunteered the proposal that consideration might be given to a tripartite arrangement, namely the United States, Australia and New Zealand. From our point of view this seems by far the best solution and I would urge that Spender and you endeavour to carry this proposal further[141]

When Holland urged Doidge that he and Spender should push the idea of a tripartite treaty he was referring to a series of meetings to be held in Canberra on 15-18 February 1951.

This was a major 'breakthrough' in the formation of a Pacific Pact as the main stumbling block of membership had apparently been resolved. New Zealand did not want to include the Asian nations and this option offered by Rusk solved this problem. Such a pact would allow New Zealand to concentrate its military efforts in the Middle East while being secure in the knowledge that any threat to home shores would be met by the United States.

The tripartite arrangement allayed any concerns the External Affairs Department had about New Zealand being tied to other nations in Asia and they fully supported the policy of pursuing such an agreement. The military had their

[141] *ibid*

way as well as this would complement New Zealand's Middle East commitment rather than draw resources from it.

Simultaneously with Holland's telegram to Doidge covering the Rusk meeting and instructing his Minister to push for the tripartite pact, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Wellington presented his Governments views on the security arrangements in the Pacific. The British government was clearly against the idea of a Pacific pact. The reasons were given as:

- New Zealand would not be able to fully fulfil its military commitments to the Middle East in time of war

- Such a Pact would not prevent Japan from rearming and becoming a threat to New Zealand again.

- The prestige and commitment of the United Kingdom to the region would come into question if it was not part of the Pact

- The Pact could be viewed as a 'white man's pact,' which may generate problems when dealing with India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

- The exclusion of the South Pacific Islands (such as Fiji) would cause complications.

Such was the United Kingdom's concern that the pressure continued to be applied. The letter went on to say that:

> ...any arrangement in which the United Kingdom was not a full participant might give rise to suspicions that it might be hard to dispel of some rift in policy between the United Kingdom and the United States.
>
> The United Kingdom Government think that the New Zealand Government will themselves share their views as to many of the difficulties outlined...- difficulties which appear to affect the interests of New Zealand equally with those of the United Kingdom – and will feel that, in the forthcoming discussions, the approach to the proposals should be a cautious one so that there may be full opportunity of further consultation between the New Zealand, Australian and United Kingdom governments before any decisions are reached.[142]

Obviously a number of the objections raised by the United Kingdom did not apply to the tripartite pact (if it could be agreed upon) as Japan was not to be part of it and therefore there was no requirement for New Zealand to fight in their defence. An American security guarantee would also provide a defence against any future Japanese aggression. In terms of New Zealand's commitment to the Middle East, and contrary to the United Kingdom's views, a pact would free up military resources as New Zealand would not have to worry about a direct attack in the south Pacific.

[142] PRICE, C. to DOIDGE, F. *letter: 8 February 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.580

Nonetheless, there were some objections that would still hold if New Zealand entered into a limited pact with only Australia and the United States. New Zealand, were it to press ahead with a Pacific Pact, would do so against the wishes of the United Kingdom.

Ten days later on the 15 February, Spender, Dulles and Doidge meet in Canberra for a series of talks. During the discussions New Zealand and Australia continued to push for an American security guarantee as a condition for supporting a Japanese peace treaty.

Prior to attending the talks Holland sent Doidge a telegram detailing why a Pacific pact was important to New Zealand. In it he stated:

> "I am thinking of our obligations in the Middle East and we must be careful that our enthusiasm for a Pacific pact does not lead us into obligations that would conflict with those we undertook to fulfil in the Middle East. We cannot do both. The point I have put forward to Mr Acheson is that so long as New Zealand is making its maximum effort in some approved theatre, then we should, in return, qualify for defensive protection by the United States. Without such an assurance we would be obliged to reduce our Middle East commitments so as to man our home defences as best we could. Mr. Acheson said he agreed that this reasoning was entirely sound.[143]

This statement is extremely important as it clearly shows the New Zealand Government thinking on the reality of the relationship with the United Kingdom.

Holland was acknowledging that it was the United States, not the United Kingdom, upon which New Zealand's defence relied. More importantly though it shows that New Zealand was *not* willing to sacrifice the defence of New Zealand on an altar of Commonwealth loyalty. New Zealand, if threatened, would not send its troops to fight in the Middle East unless other assurances for home security were in place. Yet this was still against the wishes of both the New Zealand military and the United Kingdom. The Chiefs of Staff said in their report of 28 April that New Zealand should concentrate on the Middle East believing this to be more important to New Zealand's security than South-East Asia.

During the discussions the United States continued to emphasise their belief that the Japanese Peace Treaty was vitally important in preventing the further spread of communism and the possible destabilisation of the region. Both New Zealand and Australia agreed, but continued to state this was not reason enough for their acceptance of the treaty. An American security guarantee, preferably as part of tripartite security pact, would be necessary for New Zealand and Australia's support for the peace treaty.

By the time the talks ended on the 17 February, both achieved their objectives. New Zealand and Australia would support the Japanese Peace Treaty and the United States would agree to a tripartite security treaty with the United States – ANZUS. One point of concern remained however- the position of the Philippines.

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[143] NEW ZEALAND DELEGATION TO THE AUSTRALIAN – NEW ZEALAND – UNITED STATES TALKS IN CANBERRA, *Summary of Discussions on the Japanese Peace Settlement: 15-17*

The United States wanted it included in any Pacific security arrangement, due to the close relationship between the two, but neither New Zealand nor Australia favoured inclusion. Still if this was to be the price of obtaining a security treaty, both were actually prepared to pay.

At this stage a draft document was produced although it was far from certain that a treaty would result. The draft would have to be cleared by the respective governments, and though this would not be a problem for New Zealand and Australia there was the possibility the United States Congress would not support it.

The United Kingdom did not support the treaty and continued to apply pressure on its perspective participants to have it stopped. New Zealand's High Commissioner in Canberra wrote to Doidge on the matter on 12 March:

> [The] Department of External Affairs are most concerned at a lack of a reply from London to their request for United Kingdom Government's comments on security pact proposals and it appears to be their belief that a reply is being withheld until such time as United Kingdom have done their utmost to persuade Americans to switch from a pact to something in nature of a presidential declaration.[144]

The United Kingdom did contact Holland on the 16 March concerning the formation of the Pacific pact. They were not against the idea of a tripartite pact

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February 1951, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.594
[144] ALDERTON, G. to DOIDGE, F. *telegram: 12 March 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.655

but were strongly opposed to the inclusion of the Philippines. As Patrick Walker[145] stated:

> Our...anxiety is that in view of the United Kingdom's essential interest in the Pacific arising from her Commonwealth connections as well as her territorial possessions there the treaty in its present form might be read as implying that the United Kingdom was renouncing its proper share of responsibility in the area. Again it might give the impression that the United Kingdom was being unduly subservient to the United States in the Pacific, which, at a time when public opinion in the United Kingdom is particularly sensitive on this point in relation to naval appointments in the Atlantic, would not be in the best interests of Anglo-American relations. Indeed neither of these impressions would be helpful to our common cause, which is why I feel justified in speaking to you so frankly on the subject. Both these impressions would be strengthened if, while the United Kingdom did not participate in the treaty, the Philippines were permitted to do so.[146]

It seems the United Kingdom was less concerned with the prospect of a pact, as long as it did not include the Philippines and it would not oppose a pact if this was the case. However it would be fair to say that neither were they happy with the prospect, asking that:

> When time comes we would of course wish to state publicly the attitude of the United Kingdom Government welcoming the treaty and making it clear that we had been consulted throughout. It would help us greatly if both our governments and the Australian Government also were to make concerted statements laying emphasis on the value of the treaty as a contribution towards Commonwealth security and as a reinforcement of the vital interests of the United Kingdom, Australia and

[145] Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs
[146] WALKER, P. to HOLLAND, S. *telegram: 16 March 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.660

> New Zealand in the whole of the Pacific area: and stating that our three governments regard the pact as complementary to the mutual support and co-operation between our three countries which have always been so essential part of our relationship.[147]

From this both New Zealand and Australia took the view that the United Kingdom would not stand in the way of a tripartite treaty: Menzies wrote to Holland on the 16 March[148] that:

> As I interpret United Kingdom Government's attitude, they now accept,...a tripartite arrangement between the United States, New Zealand and Australia. This is notable step forward. On the other hand they are quite opposed to the inclusion of the Philippines in a quadripartite pact of a similar nature.[149]

Neither New Zealand or Australia welcomed the idea that the Philippines would be included in any security arrangement with the United States. However both sides were prepared to accept their inclusion if that was what was needed to get Washington to enter into a pact.

The British attitude toward the Philippines inclusion though would threaten Wellington and Canberra's efforts in obtaining a security arrangement. Rather than simply push for the non-inclusion of the Philippines, London tried to derail the whole thing. This annoyed both the New Zealanders and the Australians. New Zealand was not prepared to accept the British view and forego the treaty

[147] *ibid*. pp.659-60
[148] Australia received the telegram from Walker a day earlier than New Zealand
[149] MENZIES, R. to HOLLAND, S. *telegram: 16 March 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.660

because of United Kingdom concerns at how it would be perceived at home or by other nations in the region. McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 16 March being very blunt about the British actions:

> The British obviously are doing their best to torpedo the whole thing.[150]

To which Berendsen replied on 2 April:

> ...I have read with great interest, and of course complete understanding, of your exasperation with the British efforts. We are all convinced here that they are really doing their best to torpedo the whole thing as you say and they may very well succeed in doing it. It will want very careful watching and might require some very plain speaking indeed. It is not perhaps without significance that we get practically nothing at all from the British Embassy as to what they are doing, though they are and have been in frequent touch with the State Department on this matter[151]

The New Zealand Cabinet was well aware a treaty would have a major impact on New Zealand's external relations, particularly with reference to the United Kingdom. It was noted that Clifton Webb[152]:

> ...was not without misgivings regarding the arrangement. If we made this treaty with the United States of America we could no longer "pound the table on the matter of Imperial preference"; furthermore, it would admit important psychological changes in our attitude to the United

[150] MCINTOSH, A. to BERENDSEN, C. *letter: 16 March 1951*, in MCGIBBON, I. Undiplomatic Dialogue, p.255
[151] BERENDSEN, C. to MCINTOSH, A. *letter: 2 April 1951*, *ibid*, p.256-257
[152] Attorney-General and Minister of Justice

> Kingdom. It was very important that we appreciate this and the implications of the treaty.[153]

At the end of the discussion Doidge stated his, and the Prime Minister's, position:

> *Mr Doidge* ...emphasizing that while there was difficulties to which the Ministers had referred, it was neverless of supreme importance to New Zealand that we obtain a guarantee of our security from the United States of America. The United Kingdom no longer had the strength to protect us: "Britannia no longer ruled the waves". It was vital to get a United States guarantee and, given all the objections, it was even more important that we accept the proposed treaty.[154]

Still New Zealand and Australia continued to push the United States not to include the Philippines in the final draft of the treaty. Neither trusted the latter and could see no benefit to its inclusion. Both urged the United States to arrange a separate agreement with the Philippines to resolve the issue. This would also mollify the United Kingdom who remained adamant the Philippines should not be included. While seeking an alternative, both remained prepared to resist the wishes of the United Kingdom to obtain what they wanted from the United States.

The United States informed Berendsen on 13 April they understood the New Zealand, Australian and British attitude towards the Philippines and hoped after discussions with the latter they would be able to offer New Zealand and Australia

[153] NEW ZEALAND CABINET, *Note of a Cabinet Discussion on 22 March 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.673
[154] *ibid.* p.674

a tripartite treaty. This they did and on the 18 April, President Truman issued a statement concerning Pacific security in which he said:

> The Governments of Australia and New Zealand, in connection with the re-establishment of peace with Japan, have suggested an arrangement between them and the United States, pursuant to Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter, which would make clear in the event of an armed attack upon any one of them in the Pacific, each of the three would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes, and which would establish consultation to strengthen security on the basis of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.
>
> "The possibilities of such an arrangement were fully explored by Mr Dulles at Canberra, Australia, and Wellington, New Zealand, and have been informally discussed with the appropriate sub-committees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House.
>
> "I have now asked the Secretary of State [Acheson], the Secretary of Defence [Marshall] and Mr Dulles...to pursue this matter further concurrently with the prosecution of the other negotiations necessary to bring the Japanese peace settlement to an early and satisfactory conclusion.[155]

New Zealand and Australia publicly welcomed Truman's statement and over the next three months the text of the treaty was negotiated.

On the 13 April Doidge presented to the House a draft treaty between New Zealand, Australia and the United States for approval. It was hoped that subject

[155] BERENDSEN, C. to DOIDGE, F. *Text of President Truman's statement of 18 April 1951: letter 18 April 1951*, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.701

to the other countries also ratifying the agreement it could be signed later in the year. This occurred and on 1 September 1951, the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States was signed by all parties at San Francisco. Eight days later The Treaty of Peace with Japan was also signed.

Conclusion

The signing of the ANZUS treaty was a major achievement for New Zealand external relations. It clearly shows that New Zealand followed a policy which it had decided to embark on independently from any other nation (though in collaboration with Australia and later on the United States). It continued to push ahead with its goal of achieving a security arrangement despite initial United States reluctance and British opposition to the idea.

This was in stark contrast to New Zealand's previous dealings with the United States. As discussed earlier in this thesis, despite New Zealand's contribution to the war effort and its commitment to the BCOF the United States had effectively ignored New Zealand and other contributors and acted according to its own interests only following the surrender and occupation of Japan. However, the war in Korea, and the United States desire to quickly wrap up a Japanese Peace Treaty, enabled New Zealand and Australia to exert some degree of pressure on the United States. There could not be a comprehensive peace treaty unless all

the participants in the war concurred. By using this New Zealand and Australia managed to extract an important concession, the ANZUS Pact, from the United States.

The ANZUS Pact was also an acknowledgement that the United Kingdom could no longer be relied upon to provide for the security of New Zealand. Were a future threat to arise from Japan, or communism, it would be the United States that New Zealand would need to rely upon. The United Kingdom, believing Europe and the Middle East as the crucial theatres of a future war were obliged to concentrated its resource there and could not guarantee their availability to fight in the Pacific as well.

There was no direct threat to New Zealand at this time. This was the opinion of both the Chiefs of Staff and the Department of External Affairs. There was, however, a possibility that were Japan allowed to rearm under a peace treaty it could again pose a threat to New Zealand. This was the driving force behind New Zealand and Australia's desire for a security arrangement with the United States.

Prior to ANZUS New Zealand had based its security policy upon the capabilities of the United Kingdom in the belief this would best serve New Zealand's interests. With the signing of the ANZUS Pact, however, New Zealand moved the basis of its security policy away from the United Kingdom towards the

United States. New Zealand was still committed to the ideal of Commonwealth security and was even prepared to fight in the Middle East if a 'Third World War' started, but, as Holland pointed out in his telegram of 7 February 1951, only if the United States would guarantee New Zealand's security. Without this guarantee New Zealand would not be able to fulfil its Middle East commitments.

The New Zealand policy of pursuing an American security guarantee also placed it in a position counter to that of the United Kingdom. There was concern in London over the form such a guarantee would take and the implications for them of any such initiative. Consequently they were against the idea of a Pacific Pact.

The United Kingdom, despite concentrating its efforts on the new Atlantic Pact, was concerned it would 'lose face' if a Pacific Pact was concluded. It would be further evidence the United Kingdom was no longer the world power it had once been. The idea of a pact between Australia, New Zealand and the United States that did not include them was barely acceptable and though they were not keen on it, they would not actively oppose it. However the possible inclusion of the Philippines in any security arrangement was unacceptable to London and as a result they were prepared to stonewall any pact, even if this was against the interests of both New Zealand and Australia.

However, both New Zealand and Australia forged ahead and achieved what they believed was vital to their national interest. This clearly shows that New Zealand was an independent nation, not merely a British outpost in the South Pacific, and was prepared to act accordingly.

Ironically it was a staunch anglophile Prime Minister Holland and his government adopted this policy. Holland, who had described himself as "Britisher through and through" had placed New Zealand's interests ahead of those of the 'Mother Country' by continuing to push for a pact. He pursued a major policy development (i.e. the ANZUS Pact) in external affairs in isolation from New Zealand's traditional security partner, the United Kingdom. As a long term consequence New Zealand had re-orientated its security affairs.

Nonetheless, and in the short term, New Zealand saw the pact as complementary to Commonwealth arrangements by 'closing the back door' and allowing it to concentrate on its Commonwealth commitments in the Middle East. This commitment was, however, now dependant on New Zealand's own security concerns and as the United Kingdom could not allay these, Wellington would look towards the United States to meet its security needs. As such, the United States became more important to New Zealand in security and defence than the United Kingdom.

Yet again the actions by New Zealand clearly followed Vital's 'active' policy framework in that New Zealand attempted to, and succeeded in altering its external relations with a much larger nation. New Zealand, a small and independent state wanted a security undertaking from the United States and received it by withholding its support for the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Had New Zealand simply signed off on the peace treaty without obtaining its needs, this would have followed the 'passive' course of action. But it clearly did not. New Zealand did not accept it was too small to influence the United States and along with Australia it succeeded in its aims.

In terms of the hypotheses, both were shown to be valid in this case study.

H1 That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when deciding its external affairs policy

New Zealand, with Australia, wanted a security guarantee (which later became a desire for a formal treaty) from the United States as a condition for agreeing to the Japanese Peace Treaty. This policy was decided upon in Wellington (and Canberra) and not another country. Indeed, it took some effort to bring the United States around to the New Zealand/Australia view. The United Kingdom was against the idea of a Pacific Pact and actively opposed it. Notwithstanding,

New Zealand continued to press the United States for the pact even when it was aware of the United Kingdom's opposition to it.

H2 New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first and not another country.

Again this was clearly the case. New Zealand wanted an American undertaking for its own security. New Zealand saw it as 'the richest prize' in its external affairs and of benefit to New Zealand. It had with this arrangement made New Zealand 'safe' from any future threats through the protection of the United States.

H3 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relations goals.

New Zealand clearly achieved its goal with the formation of the ANZUS Treaty. New Zealand was concerned with the prospect of a rearmed Japan and would not agree to any final settlement with Japan unless its concerns were allayed. These concerns were addressed and accordingly the hypothesis was shown to be valid.

The ANZUS Treaty was the turning point in New Zealand's post war security direction. The United Kingdom and Commonwealth defence would still hold an

important place in New Zealand's external affairs, but this would diminish as the relationship with the United States grew. The latter relationship continued to strengthen and within fifteen years would become the dominant feature of New Zealand's security and external relations policies.

Chapter Four:

Conclusion

This thesis has argued that for the period commencing with the outbreak of the Pacific War (1942) through to the signing of the ANZUS Pact (1952) New Zealand acted independently of other nations on important national issues. As a small nation New Zealand was dealing with other countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, which were larger and more powerful in all respects. Despite this, New Zealand forged ahead with objectives that satisfied its interests, and attempted to persuade the larger nations to be cognizant and supportive of these.

In the course of this thesis, the following hypotheses were examined:

- **H1 That New Zealand acted independently of any other country when deciding its external affairs policy.**
- **H2 That New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first and not another country.**

- **H2 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relation goals.**

In order to examine these hypotheses, this thesis studied two important external affairs initiatives: the first being New Zealand's involvement in the surrender and occupation of Japan; the second being the formulation of the ANZUS Pact. While studying these initiatives this thesis focused on answering the following questions:

- Was New Zealand acting independently when it decided upon its course of action?
- Was New Zealand making decisions in New Zealand's interests or those of other nations?
- What was New Zealand hoping to achieve with this policy?
- Was New Zealand successful in obtaining its goals with its policy?

The election of the first Labour Government in 1935 signalled a change of emphasis in New Zealand's external relations. This did not result in a radical change in direction, but there was a difference in the way that such policy came about.

Until 1935, New Zealand had been content to follow the lead of the United Kingdom in external affairs. New Zealand was a loyal member of the British Empire; effectively a part of the United Kingdom tucked away in the South Pacific. The scope of New Zealand's relations overseas was very limited at this time. In reality, New Zealand's external relations consisted of following London

as well as trading with United Kingdom and to a small degree other countries of the Empire.

With the coming to power of Labour in 1935 New Zealand began to express its own voice in the international area. The League of Nations, of which Labour had been a vocal supporter while in opposition, was hoped to offer a forum to achieve this. Labour believed that the League's ideals of collective security would result in a more just world without war.

The new government's socialist views were in stark contrast to the conservative administration in London at the time. This coupled with a different interpretation of the Westminster Act contributed to New Zealand's desire to have its own international voice, particularly as policies emerging from Westminster became out of step with its own. This was borne out with New Zealand's refusal to support the United Kingdom's proposal to solve the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. New Zealand saw the solution forwarded by the United Kingdom as acceding to aggression by a large power.

There were also differences over policy with respect to Spain. Whereas the United Kingdom viewed the civil war as a domestic issue, and hence not a matter for the League, New Zealand was of the view that because the fascist rebellion was supported by Italy and Germany there were ample reasons for the League to get involved.

With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 New Zealand continued to align itself with the United Kingdom and without hesitation despatched disproportionate numbers of service personnel (for its size) to fight in the northern Hemisphere. However, unlike the war of 1914-18, New Zealand was not willing to accept the United Kingdom declaring war on its behalf. Though it would be inconceivable at the time not for Wellington to align itself along side London given the nature of the relationship between the two countries, New Zealand considered itself as an independent nation and as such declared war itself. New Zealand also for the duration of the war retained greater control over its armed forces than it had during either the Boer or the 1914-18 War.

The war and occupation of Japan

With Japan's entry into the war on 7 December 1941 New Zealand felt threatened for the first time in its history. This sense of vulnerability further increased with the rapid Japanese advance through Asia and the Pacific through the inability of either the United Kingdom or the United States to 'stem the tide.' This vulnerability was highlighted as the 2nd New Zealand Division (which was in effect the New Zealand Army) was in the Middle East and the majority of RNZAF aircrews were in the United Kingdom flying with the RAF against Germany.

Despite this New Zealand elected not to relocate its forces from the Northern Hemisphere. Wellington decided that such a move would hamper the war effort overall and hence would not be in New Zealand's interests. This was a bold yet responsible decision.

This decision was both encouraged and supported by the United Kingdom and the United States. However, it is incorrect to suggest they made the decision for New Zealand. If New Zealand had been determined to withdraw its forces from the Middle East and relocate them in the Pacific there is no evidence to suggest that they would have been prevented from doing so. Indeed, the fact that the Australians withdrew most of their forces to fight the Japanese suggest that had Wellington insisted, it could have done the same.

Despite the initial Japanese successes by mid 1943 the tide of the war had turned in the Pacific. The massive financial and industrial resources of the United States, once focused on defeating Japan, ensured it was a question of when, not if, the Japanese would be defeated. As the Japanese forces were pushed closer and closer to their island home, the allied powers debated the future of the defeated enemy. At the Cairo Declaration (1 December 1943), the Yalta Agreement (11 February 1945) and the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945) the major powers set the framework for the conclusion of the war.

New Zealand was not part of either of these meetings and resented not being included. This country had been threatened by the Japanese, had contributed to the war effort yet were not part of the end of war negotiations. Neither was New Zealand to be a party to the Japanese surrender on 14 August 1945.

The United States initially denied New Zealand the opportunity to be a signatory at the formal surrender on the USS *Missouri.* This decision was eventually changed after pressure from the United Kingdom, Australia (who were also going to be denied signatory rights) and New Zealand. Following approval to be a signatory to the surrender document New Zealand was invited to participate in the FEC. The change of heart also coincided with the decision by New Zealand to contribute to the military occupation of Japan.

Two main themes were behind the decision to send military forces to Japan. First, there was a desire to see any final settlement with Japan met with New Zealand's satisfaction. New Zealand participation in the FEC was also related to this. Second, New Zealand desired to keep the Pacific region in the forefront of the United Kingdom's post war thinking.

Concern began to grow in Wellington that the United States would not be severe enough on the Japanese. New Zealand did not want Japan to 'rise again' as had Germany after the First World War. Japan had posed the first real threat

to New Zealand in its history and, understandably, New Zealand did not want this happening again.

However after 1947, this was not the view of the United States. Washington believed communism was a far greater threat than any (remote) prospect of a rearmed Japan. It was believed a harsh settlement might force Japan into the "clutches" of communism.

New Zealand hoped that through the FEC, and the credibility gained by both fighting the Japanese and by being willing to contribute to the occupation, it would be in a position to influence the United States. This did not occur and the United States basically pursued its own agenda with regard to Japan. Despite well intentioned efforts, New Zealand was not large enough to bring any meaningful pressure to bear on the United States. As a result New Zealand failed in its policy goal of actively influencing the United States to put in place the strong peace settlement upon Japan that Wellington had wanted. Instead, Washington continued with its policy of implementing a 'soft' treaty.

The second of New Zealand's goals attempted to keep the Asia-Pacific region to the fore in the minds of the government in London.

After the war the United Kingdom was struggling to maintain its world-wide commitments. The war had devastated its economy and there was worry in New

Zealand this could lead to the United Kingdom moving its forces from the Asia-Pacific to other areas deemed more vital.

By contributing forces to the BCOF New Zealand hoped it would encourage the United Kingdom to stay. That is New Zealand could not be seen to shirk its responsibilities if it was expecting others to maintain theirs. New Zealand could not expect the United Kingdom to stay involved in the region if New Zealand itself was unwilling to contribute.

This policy was initially successful. However within months the strain of world-wide commitments forced the United Kingdom to markedly reduce its commitment to the BCOF. As a result, the New Zealand policy did not achieve its goals. The United Kingdom continued to reduce its forces further and eventually New Zealand did the same. The manpower shortage in New Zealand, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom contingent and the inability to make headway with the United States in the FEC led New Zealand to withdraw completely from the occupation of Japan.

New Zealand's involvement in the surrender and occupation of Japan highlights the problem a small country can have when dealing with a much larger power. Unless New Zealand could 'bring something important to the table' it could not bring any meaningful pressure to bear upon the United States. In this instance it had very little to offer the United States other than being a 'good

international citizen.' In this instance this was insufficient and the policy did not work. The United States concern over the threat communism posed ensured they pushed ahead with policies which, in their view, would help to limit this expansion. As a result any opinion which ran counter to theirs (such as New Zealand's) had little chance of success.

Within two years of the withdrawal from the BCOF, New Zealand found itself confronting another major international crisis; the invasion of South Korea. However, the government in Wellington had changed after a recent general election.

The National party, under Sydney Holland, came to power at the end of 1949. This change in leadership did not impress the members of the fledgling Department of External affairs.

Holland was a 'dyed in the wool' anglophile with very little interest or understanding of New Zealand's external relations, while his new External Affairs Minister, Doidge, did not have a high standing in Cabinet. However, these two men would be in charge during New Zealand's decision to contribute to the United Nations effort in Korea and later the formulation of the ANZUS Pact.

Despite some of Holland's actions and the misgivings by McIntosh this became a very successful period in New Zealand's external relations.

Following the outbreak of the Korean War, New Zealand was one of the first nations to offer help. The manner in which Holland came to this decision effectively going along with the United Kingdom may not have been approved by his advisors, but it was by no means a bad decision. Circumstances dictated that a naval contribution at the early stages of the conflict was the only viable option for New Zealand.

By acting quickly New Zealand had shown its support of the United Nations, as well as the United States which was effectively assuming the responsibility for opposing the North Korean action.

Later, by sending an artillery unit rather than infantry, New Zealand managed to serve its interests effectively. They resisted Australian pressure to send an infantry battalion as this would have resulted in a higher risk of casualties and would have lessened New Zealand's Middle East contribution without altering the credence it got for its contribution.

The Korean War also lead to New Zealand's greatest external affairs achievement of the period: the signing of the ANZUS Pact of 1952.

New Zealand had been moving towards the concept of a security agreement with the United States since late 1949. With the decline in power of the United

Kingdom the possible rearmament of Japan, and a growing menace of communism, New Zealand (and Australia) wanted an arrangement with the United States to guarantee its own security.

The Korean War provided the opportunity as the United States sought to finally settle the Japanese Peace Treaty fearing that if it did not act quickly to set up a friendly administration in Tokyo, communism would fill the vacuum. However, neither New Zealand nor Australia would agree to any final settlement unless their security concerns were meet.

The possible rise of an aggressive Japan was still of concern in both Wellington and Canberra. This was understandable given the events of 1941-45, particularly the early stages of the Pacific War, where for the first time in its history New Zealand had to face the, albeit slight, possibility of invasion. Any United States settlement over Japan, would need to allay this concern for it to gain New Zealand's approval.

In contrast to the situation only a few years earlier with the FEC and BCOF, New Zealand now had something with which it could bargain. Washington needed New Zealand's support for two reasons. First they needed as many countries as possible to support their initiative and second they expected New Zealand's concurrence would help other Commonwealth countries sign up.

However, New Zealand would only accept the United States desire for a swift settlement on the condition that its security concerns were put at ease through a security arrangement with the United States and Australia that would guarantee New Zealand security. This also agreed with the Australian stance.

During a February 1951 state visit to the United States Holland received an offer from Rusk of a possible security treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. New Zealand seized the opportunity and Holland directed his External Affairs Minister Doidge to pursue the offer at a series of meeting which were to be held between the three parties in Canberra later the same month.

This was a radical change in New Zealand's security outlook. It was an acknowledgement the United Kingdom was no longer the international force of the past and that it was to the United States that New Zealand needed to turn to gain protection.

As a result of the discussions in Canberra, a draft ANZUS Treaty was produced. New Zealand had obtained the security guarantee it had so eagerly sought. On 1 September 1952 the ANZUS Treaty was signed in San Francisco.

New Zealand forged ahead with its policy of seeking a security arrangement with the United States even though, at times, the United Kingdom was opposed

to it. Wellington had decided that it was in New Zealand's interests to follow this policy and would not be swayed by the 'Mother-Country.'

Hypothesis 1: That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when deciding its external affairs policy.

As has been shown New Zealand did, during the 1942-52 period, act as an independent nation in the international arena. The relationship with the United Kingdom was very close as a result of cultural, historical and economic links. However these links did not extend as far dictating New Zealand's external affairs policies.

There had been disagreements in the League of Nations over Abyssinia and Spain with the United Kingdom, yet it was the outbreak of the Second World War which saw New Zealand take its place as an independent country on the world stage. Unlike the First World War, New Zealand was not willing to go to war under the United Kingdom's declaration and as such declared war itself It also maintained firm control over its forces afield.

New Zealand was no longer content to have its policy made in London. This was not a result of any anti-British feeling in Wellington, far from it, but rather because New Zealand felt it was now sufficiently capable and mature to make its own decisions. Wellington still continued to seek advice from both London and

Canberra and tried to formulate policy that would coincide with these two Commonwealth countries. However, this cannot be constructed as a lack of independence. Rather it demonstrates New Zealand was attempting to formulate effective and workable policies to meet its own needs. Being a small country New Zealand still needed to work in conjunction with others to achieve the outcomes it wanted.

The entry of Japan into the war provided further evidence of New Zealand's independent stance. As with Germany in 1939, New Zealand declared war independently and also made the brave decision (although after consulting others) not to relocate its forces to the Pacific. New Zealand was not directed to take this course of action by any other country, rather it pragmatically agreed with the advice that it had been given.

With the coming to power of the National party in 1949, New Zealand continued to exercise independence in its external affairs. The case can be made that when dispatching forces to Korea Holland was only following the lead of the United Kingdom, but this is not necessarily an indication of any lack of independence on New Zealand's part. The United Kingdom did not 'hold a gun to New Zealand's head.' Rather Holland decided (independently) that he wanted to have New Zealand involved for the reasons that he believed best suited New Zealand.

The ANZUS Pact further showed the validity of the hypothesis. New Zealand, along with Australia, pushed for such a treaty despite initial United States opposition and the concerns of the United Kingdom. If New Zealand's external relations was being determined by either of these two countries it is difficult to envisage they would have allowed New Zealand to pursue a policy both had reservations about.

New Zealand clearly acted independently of other nations at all times during this period. Unsurprisingly, its policies did coincide on most occasions with those of its allies, however the decisions were solely New Zealand's. As such the hypothesis that New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when deciding its external affairs policy is valid.

Hypothesis 2: That New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first and not another country.

From the Japanese entry into the Second World War in 1942 to the signing of the ANZUS Pact of 1952, New Zealand followed policies which were designed first and foremost to service its own needs.

With the Japanese advance through Asia and into the Pacific in early 1942, New Zealand's concern naturally focused on its own security. This demanded an important decision on the best use of the 2nd NZ Division located at the time in

the Middle East. Far from being more concerned about the fighting in North Africa, as opposed to the North of Australia, New Zealand realised the best course of action for its security was to rely on the forces of the United States. The massive logistical effort required to move the New Zealand force closer to home outweighed any benefit that would be gained by such a move. Indeed, New Zealand could have been placed in greater danger

New Zealand's position with regard to the surrender and occupation of Japan also reflected New Zealand's primary concern for itself. Wellington was keen to see that Japan was not going to be in a position to threaten its shores again. The desire to keep the United Kingdom involved in this region was also clearly made with New Zealand's interests clearly at its core.

This theme continued with the ANZUS Pact. The worry about a possible Japanese resurgence, and to a lesser degree the threat posed by communism to New Zealand, was behind the decision to seek a security agreement. There is no evidence at all to suggest that New Zealand entered into ANZUS to help other countries. Both the United States and Australia also benefited from the pact, but their concerns, particularly that of the former, were certainly not behind New Zealand's initiatives.

During the period covered in this thesis, New Zealand acted in way to first benefit New Zealand and not another country and hence the hypothesis is valid.

Hypothesis 3: That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relation goals.

While it would be correct to say that New Zealand's involvement with the war against Japan was very small overall, and did not materially alter the outcome, it is true that New Zealand's policy was successful, as Japan was defeated.

Following the occupation and surrender of Japan it would be accurate to say that New Zealand was unsuccessful in promoting its policies though the concern about a new Japanese threat never materialised. Wellington was unable to get the 'hard' final settlement terms it had wanted against the Japanese as the United States unilaterally forced through its own policies. Again, the policy of trying to keep the United Kingdom involved in the region was also a failure. The United Kingdom was simply unable to sustain a large enough presence in the region to satisfy Wellington despite the urging of New Zealand; other priorities assumed importance for the old 'Mother Country.'

However, New Zealand was successful in its goal of obtaining a security agreement with the United States and Australia. This was perhaps the major external affairs achievement of the post-war period and became the cornerstone of New Zealand's security policy for the next thirty-two years.

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